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ated new ways to provide local service.' Some
analysts maintain, however, that LECs still have a
monopoly over access service to the local loop, de-
spite technologies that "bypass" LEC facilities to
provide service directly to the consumer.2 In the
1990s, LECs must compete with alternate local ex-
' See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulating Telecommuni-
cations, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25 (1995); William B. Garrison &
Leslie A. Taylor, Wireless Telecom. Innovations: New Players,
New Structures, New Regulation, COMM. LAW., Winter, 1994,
at 1.
2 See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Gregory Sidak, The Pric-
ing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 171
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change service providers, including those providers
introducing innovative wireless services in the local
exchange market. Although there are other competi-
tors to the LEC in the local loop,8 wireless service
providers are the focus of this article."
It is noteworthy that the term "new wireless ser-
vice provider" may prove to be a misnomer because
many of the companies providing new wireless ser-
vices are well-established telecommunications com-
panies, including several Bell Operating Companies
("BOCs") (e.g., forming joint ventures to complete
Personal Communications Services systems). In dis-
cussing "new wireless service providers," it is the
service and not necessarily the provider that is new
to the local exchange market. If anything, current
providers will be expanding into different service ar-
eas and forming new strategic alliances. Although
consumers are becoming more comfortable with the
"information technologies revolution" through, for
example, the use of personal computers and access to
the Internet, consumers will still be wary of replac-
ing the wired telephone and the local access provider
that has served them for over a decade.
5
Wireless technologies in the local exchange market
will change the manner in which every American
consumer views local telephone service. Wireless ser-
vices, such as Personal Communications Services
(1994). The authors stated that "technological innovation and
the prospect of falling regulatory barriers to entry now expose
some portions of the local exchange to competition from cable
television systems, wireless telephony, and rival wireline sys-
tems." Id. at 174. The authors concluded that "[n]evertheless, it
is probable that certain parts of local telephony will remain nat-
urally monopolistic." Id. Baumol and Sidak claimed that the pri-
mary 'bottleneck' (service over which BOCs still have a monop-
oly) is the LECs' control of facilities used to supply access
service - that is, the service that provides the connection between
messages received from outside areas and the local loop. Id.
' Spulber, supra note 1, at 39-40. Cable companies, for ex-
ample, are now capable of delivering telephone services and
other integrated telecommunications services. Id. See also Mark
Berniker, Cablevision Upgrade Gives Connecticut New Services,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 28, 1995, at 14(Cablevision
Systems Corp. is developing a suite of television, telephone, and
PC-based services for certain customers in southern
Connecticut.).
" Although this article focuses on new wireless service prov-
iders, cellular operators have been in the market for over a dec-
ade and their sales are continuing to increase. See NAT. TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COM.,
REPORT (1995). Cellular operators are currently enrolling about
28,000 new customers per day. Id. See also Reed E. Hundt, Re-
marks at the VIP Luncheon of Phillips Business Information
Inc. (Aug. 25, 1995) [hereinafter Phillips Luncheon Speech]
(stating that "[tihe number of cellular subscribers grew last year
by almost 50 percent, to more than 25 million. Wireless is the
fastest growing sector of the U.S. economy in terms of new cus-
("PCS"),e are becoming viable competitors to the
BOCs in the local exchange market.7 The local wire-
line exchange will no longer continue to be profitable
for BOCs unless they diversify their product bases.
Initially, consumers will purchase the new genera-
tion of wireless services as a supplement to the wire-
line service they already utilize- in their homes, as is
currently the case with cellular service. This may not
be the case for business users, who may switch more
readily to wireless services if those services prove to
be more cost-effective than their current wireline ser-
vice. The business market alone may dictate which
service providers will be successful in local exchange
service because the business sector accounts for a
large portion of the LECs' profits.' Also, wireless
services have the potential to be cheaper than copper
in the local loop. "As of 1992, the established cellu-
lar carriers had invested about $10 billion, or about
$1,000 per subscriber... [bly comparison it costs an
average of about $1,500 to $2,500 to deploy a local
copper loop, and those costs are not declining at
all."9
This article examines two issues relating to the
phenomenon of local loop competition from wireless
services. The first issue is whether the introduction
of wireless services in the local exchange market will
render wireline local exchange service obsolete, or
tomers added").
5 If consumers do replace their old telephone service it may
be with technologies that they are already accustomed to, such as
cable companies who can provide them with an integrated pack-
age of cable, broadcast and telephone service. See infra notes
140-153 and accompanying text.
6 PCS, discussed infra part III, is broadly defined by the
Commission as a family of mobile or portable radio communica-
tions services with the ability to provide services to individuals
and businesses. In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to
Establish New Personal Communications Services, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking & Tentative Decision, 7 FCC Rcd. 5676,
para. 29 (1992) [hereinafter PCS NPRM].
7 On July 26, 1995, American Personal Communications,
Inc. ("APC"), a broadband PCS pioneer's preference winner,
invited Senators Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) and Bob Packwood (R-
Or.) to the first public demonstration of APC's PCS system.
With commercial operations of this system expected to begin this
fall, it is anticipated that APC will be the first PCS provider in
the United States. John Grotland et al., APC Gives Public
Viewing of PCS System; Sens. Packwood, Pressler Make Phone
Calls, PCS WK., Aug. 2, 1995, at 1, 8.
8 See John J. Keller, Maw Bell: AT&T Eagerly Plots a
Strategy to Gobble Local Phone Business, WALL ST. J., Aug.
21, 1995, at Al. Bell Atlantic's Vice Chairman stated that busi-
nesses and affluent individuals who use everything from local
services to call-waiting, voice-mail, and multiple phone exten-
sions "account for 75 percent of our profit margin." Id.
9 MICHAEL KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS LAW § 1.8, at 3 (1992 ed. & Supp. 1995).
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whether wireless services will simply continue to
supplement the wireline local exchange. The answer
depends on several factors including: the needs and
desires of the consumer (both business and residen-
tial); the infrastructure and name recognition already
established by the incumbent LEC in each region;1"
the policies and regulations of the Federal Commu-
nications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission")
concerning competitive issues in the local exchange
market; and the ability of the BOCs to adapt to a
rapidly changing marketplace."
The second issue is the extent to which the wire-
line market will suffer economic loss as a result of
wireless technology use in the local loop. That is, the
amount of profits that the wireline providers will
loose to the wireless competitor. In addition, the
LECs' preparation to compete effectively in such an
environment will be a factor to be analyzed.
The answer to both issues depends on how much
involvement the LECs have in providing wireless
services themselves, primarily on an integrated basis
with their current wireline exchange services, and
whether they will provide other services in order to
compete.
In order to provide customers with every commu-
nication need in one package, several RBOCs are
positioning themselves to provide integrated services,
termed "one-stop shopping."' 2 LECs have been
making, and will continue to make, strategic moves
to compete both in-region and out-of-region through
their own facilities and also through separate subsid-
iaries (BOC affiliates).1" Assuming the wireline ex-
change will be in existence for many years to come,
the percentage of the local exchange market lost to
new wireless service providers will depend, in large
part, on the ability of wireless service providers to
1" The term "LEC" for purposes of this article will be used
to describe the seven Regional Bell Operating Companies
("RBOCs" or "BOCs") as well as all independent telephone
companies that provide local telephone service. These terms are
used interchangeably in this article, although the BOCs remain
the dominant local exchange providers in most markets, and are
the focus of this article.
" The current regulatory position of the Commission with
regard to allowing LECs to compete with new entrants in the
local exchange market should not be overlooked. The Commis-
sion has the power to promote competition by implementing pol-
icy that allows for rapid developments in the telecommunications
industry. In the alternative, the Commission could resist changes
to regulatory barriers that currently make it difficult for BOCs
to compete fully with other potential and current local loop
providers. Despite the Commission's demonstrated willingness to
aggressively pursue a competitive environment in the local ex-
change market for the benefit of the consumer, the agency con-
tinues to struggle with a regulatory and statutory structure that
anticipate the needs of customers and to build a
strong customer base despite the presence of the in-
cumbent BOC.
This article examines current trends in the local
exchange market in five parts. Part I gives a histori-
cal overview of the local exchange market, focusing
on the creation of the BOCs and the outdated notion
of a "natural monopoly" that has been used to define
the post-divestiture local exchange market. Part II
explains the current and potential wireless services
that will continue to influence competition in the lo-
cal exchange market. In addition, Part II briefly
summarizes the Commission's auction process for
new wireless services, and discusses several obstacles
that new wireless service providers are facing in
their attempts to establish wireless systems in the lo-
cal exchange market.
Part III analyzes the Commission's current regu-
latory position with regard to fostering local loop
competition and the policies and regulations the
Commission is implementing to help establish inno-
vative wireless service providers as viable competitors
in the local exchange market. Part IV discusses the
methods used by the LECs to counteract impending
competition in local exchange telephone service, an
area that has been exclusively their own since the
1982 divestiture. 4 Part IV also analyzes whether
changes in the way service is provided in the local
exchange market, brought about by the wireless
technological innovations in the 1990s, will cause
LECs to suffer economic loss, and if so, to what ex-
tent these effects will be minimized as a result of
strategic planning by LECs.
Part V of this article examines the future of the
local exchange market. Specifically, whether the
opening of the local exchange market, dubbed the
has been in existence for over 60 years. Although pending legis-
lation, which may eliminate restrictions on BOCs and open up
the local exchange market, may soon be enacted, LECs need the
ability to strategize for the 21st century now and much of that
strategy is dependent on Commission action that must effectively
balance the needs of new wireless service providers and the in-
cumbent LEC in any given region. See discussion infra part III.
2 See In re Motion of Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems,
Inc. for a Declaratory Ruling that Section 22.903 and Other
Sections of the Rules of the Commission Permit the Cellular Af-
filiate of a Bell Operating Company to Provide Competitive
Landline Local Exchange Service Outside the Region in Which
the Bell Operating Company is the Local Exchange Carrier,
Motion for Declaratory Ruling, CWD 95-5 (Oct. 25, 1995)(on
file with author) (hereinafter SBMS Declaratory Ruling].
is "In-region" refers to the service area in which a BOC
provides local exchange service. "Out-of-region" refers to all
other service areas (where other BOCs are the dominant LECs).
14 See discussion infra note 17 and accompanying text.
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"last bottleneck" of communications, will realisti-
cally create a competitive environment for all service
providers. Part V also discusses whether smaller
companies and diverse new firms will be able to
enter the local telecommunications market. Finally,
Part V analyzes whether the actions taken by the
Commission, in concert with changes made by state
regulatory bodies and the courts, will provide for ef-
fective competition in the local loop.
I. LOCAL EXCHANGE MARKET
OVERVIEW
Prior to 1982, the telecommunications market was
dominated entirely by the Bell System. Several al-
leged antitrust violations ultimately led to a 1982
Consent Decree which was subsequently modified,
becoming known as the Modification of Final Judge-
ment ("MFJ").'6 The MFJ divided the telecommu-
nications industry into two distinct areas: long dis-
tance and local exchange service.16 Consequently,
long distance and equipment manufacturing were
left in the hands of the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company ("AT&T"). In addition, local
exchange services were then divided among the seven
Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs")
(serving the seven regions of the country)."
The local exchange has proven to be the most du-
rable component of the old monopoly."8 In 1982, it
seemed to Judge Greene, and indeed to most mem-
bers of the industry, that the long-distance market
was suited to competition whereas the local exchange
was a "natural monopoly."' 9 The local exchange
market has been defined as a "natural monopoly" by
many industry experts because local exchange service
has traditionally been provided by landline facilities
(i.e. twisted copper wires which carry transmission
" United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. Cir. 1982), alt'd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
ie See generally KELLOGG ET AL., supra, note 9, §§ 1.6, 1.7
(discussing break up of the Bell System).
' The seven RBOCs are the operating companies: Amer-
itech, The Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies, BellSouth Tele-
communications, Inc., New England Telephone and Telegraph
and New York Telephone Company (NYNEX), Pacific Bell
and Nevada Bell (Pacific Telesis Group), Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company, and US West Communications, Inc.
18 KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, at 30-31.
' Id. at 5-6.
20 Id. See also ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS oF REG-
ULATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 113-26 (2d ed.
1989).
21 KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, at 6. See also James Wal-
signals from a central office switch to a subscriber's
home or office). 2" Thus, in the local exchange, a sin-
gle telephone company "could serve an entire local
market much more cheaply than could two or more
competitors," because of the high cost of duplicating
the infrastructure.2 The local exchange market
functioning as a monopoly was preferred by mem-
bers of the industry and regulators alike because in
1982 there was no apparent benefit to laying more
than one system of copper wire for the "last mile" to
a customer's house.2 2 The natural monopoly theory,
therefore, is used as a justification for both state and
federal regulation of the industry.
23
The fundamental problem with defining the local
exchange market as a "natural monopoly," and reg-
ulating it as such, is that even from the initial years
of divestiture (the early 1980s) the local exchange
was facing competition from radio services. 4 Multi-
ple alternative modes of transmission including coax-
ial cable, fiber-optic cable, satellite, microwave, cel-
lular, and other radio technologies currently exist.
2 1
The restrictions placed on the BOCs by the MFJ
were justified by arguments that the local exchange
network was a natural monopoly, that the carriers
benefitted from barriers to entry, that BOCs could
leverage their monopoly power into other markets,
and that BOCs would use revenues from local ser-
vice to subsidize their entry into other lines of
business. 6
The MFJ did not take into account the effect of
radio technology in the local exchange market.2 7 The
MFJ has subsequently become outdated because it is
based on assumptions that are no longer a reality for
the telecommunications industry, i.e., that LECs are
the only providers of local telephone service, that
LECs dominate the local market, and that regula-
tions need to be placed on BOCs to prevent their
dominating influence in other areas of telecommuni-
ter Grudus, Local Broadband Networks: A New Regulatory
Philosophy, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 96 (1993) (stating that
copper telephone wires "represent a substantial capital invest-
ment subject to lengthy depreciation periods and require consid-
erable annual investment").
22 KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, at 6.
28 Spulber, supra note 1, at 32.
2" KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, at 6.
'5 Spulber, supra note 1, at 34. See also Sumner Redstone,
Keynote Address, Telecommunications in the 1990s - From
Wasteland to Global Network (Apr. 2, 1993) in 11 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 133, 136 (1993)(stating that basic telephone service, once
perceived as a natural monopoly, may be a "pipe dream").
"' See Spulber, supra note 1, at 34 (discussing the reasons
why these restrictions are no longer valid due to the technologi-
cal and market changes in the telecommunications industry).
1," KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, at 6.
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cations. For example, new developments in switching
have allowed customer premises equipment, such as
the private branch exchange ("PBX") and local area
networks ("LANs"), to render the concept of a natu-
ral monopoly obsolete. 8 In addition, new wireless
services bring to the local market the ability to "by-
pass" the local exchange. Notwithstanding recent de-
velopments, the local exchange has a long way to go
before competition begins to thrive. The fact still re-
mains that most "local traffic" makes its way
through the local exchange at a profit to the domi-
nant LEC. However, the RBOCs realized, probably
sooner than most because of the position that they
hold, that competition is beginning to make its way
into the local exchange. The BOCs intend to be pre-
pared and have begun to lay the groundwork to
eliminate the restrictions that prevent them from en-
gaging in conduct to increase their competitive edge
as any other potential local exchange competitor is
able to do at this time.
II. CURRENT AND POTENTIAL WIRE-
LESS SERVICES
Voice telephone service was overwhelmingly pro-
vided by wireline network providers until the intro-
duction of cellular phones. With the advent of cellu-
lar service in 1983, consumers gained the portability
of mobile radio combined with service quality ade-
quate for most users, although the majority of voice
telephone service is still provided through landline
infrastructure. 9 Mobile service, specifically cellular
service, has, up until now and maybe for some time
to come, functioned primarily as an adjunct to the
landline telephone network.30 The complete substitu-
tion of wireless voice services for voice telephony has
SB Spulber, supra note 1, at 37.
" In re Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 - Annual Report and Anal-
ysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Com-
mercial Mobile Services, First Report, 10 FCC Rcd. 8844, para.
13 (1995) [hereinafter Competition Report].
"0 Garrison & Taylor, supra note 1, at 28.
31 Id.
32 See Andrew C. Barrett & Byron F. Marchant, Emerging
Technologies and Personal Communications Services: Regula-
tory Issues, 1 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 3 (1993).
" See In re Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the Commis-
sion's Rules to Permit Liberalization of Technology and Auxil-
iary Service Offerings in the Domestic Public Cellular Radio
Telecommunications Service, Report and Order, 3 FCC Rcd.
7033 (1988). In this Order the Commission relaxed its require-
ment that all cellular systems meet a specific analog technical
standard thereby permitting cellular carriers to adopt new tech-
nologies, provided the carrier continued supporting the analog
never previously been a serious possibility due to the
limited system capacity, limited service provision,
relative expense and low service quality of cellular
service."1
Currently, all competitors depend on access to or
interconnection with the local exchange market to
enable them to provide service. This situation is
changing as technological developments allow service
providers to by-pass the local wireline network. Ad-
vancements in digital and wireless technologies are
spawning new services, such as PCS or Personal
Communications Networks ("PCNs") and the devel-
opment of new mobile equipment.82 In addition, the
advent of new services is speeding, up the conversion
of cellular service to digital technology."
Telecommunications companies desiring to pro-
vide local exchange service to compete with LECs
will have to offer the consumer a variety of services
that are low in cost, simple to use, and high in qual-
ity. Cellular service providers may have to make
changes, although some analysts predict that PCS
will not fare well meeting cellular head-to-head but
that it will satisfy a new type of customer."' In other
words, PCS customers may not be the people who
currently use cellular services because PCS may be
their first wireless service. However, cellular provid-
ers are preparing for competition from PCS. Cellu-
lar carriers are reducing prices and packaging their
services to better reflect customer preferences (e.g.,
high flat rates per month with more "free" minutes
for customers who use their cellular phones exten-
sively) and to better reflect what PCS providers
might offer.35 The Commission expects the cost of
cellular service to continue to decline as competition
increases.36
A number of services are currently being devel-
standard. See also Competition Report, supra note 29, para. 23
n.34. "Another effect that the approach of PCS is having on cel-
lular carriers is to hasten the conversion of cellular networks
from analog to digital technology. Digital technology, though
relatively expensive, is efficient, and is the technology with
which PCS will enter the market." Id.
84 Linda Kay Sakelaris, Leaders Prepare to Step Ahead in
Evolving Mobile Marketplace, RADIO COMM. REP., July 24,
1995.
'5 See, e.g., Herschel Shostech, Cellular Industry Eyes Fur-
ther Cuts, Adjustments to Challenge PCS, COMM. DAILY, Apr.
24, 1995, at 1. See also Mike Mills, Wireless: The Next Gener-
ation, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1995, at Fl. Indeed, "cellular car-
riers.., have been busy adopting every perceived advantage that
PCS [is] supposed to bring." Id.
36 Competition Report, supra note 29, para. 24 n.38 (citing
Price Elasticity in Cellular Will Be Tested By Greater Competi-
tion, WIRELESS Bus. & FIN., Mar. 29, 1995). "[O]ne analyst
predicts that cellular prices will decrease by about six to eight
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oped to compete with LECs in the local exchange.
The Commission defined some of the services or de-
vices being tested to include CT-2, CT-2 Plus, CT-
3, PCN, wireless PBX, and wireless local loop. 7 Al-
though wireless service providers are the focus of this
article, it is worth noting that the LECs also face
competition from industries such as cable and tele-
phone providers who plan to provide fiber for the
"last mile" to the residential user's home. However,
the cost of a fiber connection from a residence to the
local exchange network is estimated to be as much as
thirty percent higher than customer access to a wire-
less network." Thus, the possibility exists that wire-
less systems utilizing recent technological innovations
may be positioned to compete with fiber for voice
revenues and for data and video revenues as well.39
A. New Wireless Services
Local Multipoint Distribution Service ("LMDS")
is a technology that may provide services that com-
pete with local exchange carriers in the provision of
local exchange service. °
Very high subscriber capacity for two-way video
telecommunications is available through technology
developed for use in the 28 GHz frequency band.
Hub transceivers create small cells, typically six
miles in diameter, which have the dual ability of
transmitting to subscriber locations, and receiving
the subscriber transmissions on a return path.' 1 This
percent during the next two years . . . ." Id.
37 In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish
New Personal Communications Services, Second Report and Or-
der, 8 FCC Rcd. 7700, para. 8 n.11 (1993) [hereinafter PCS
Second Report and Order]. The acronym CT-2 stands for a
"cordless telephone second generation." Id.
" Garrison & Taylor, supra note 1, at 28.
39 Id.
40 In re Rulemaking to Amend Parts 1, 2, 21, and 25 of the
Commission's Rules to Redesignate the 27.5 - 29.5 GHz Fre-
quency Band, to Reallocate the 29.5 - 30.0 GHz Frequency
Band, to Establish Rules and Policies for Local Multipoint Dis-
tribution Service and For Fixed Satellite Services, Third Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking and Supplemental Tentative Decision,
60 Fed. Reg. 43,740, para. 27 (1995) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. §§ 21, 25 (1995)) [hereinafter LMDS Third NPRM/
Tentative Decision]. Reply comments in this proceeding were
extended to October 10, 1995. Id. The Commission tentatively
concluded in the LMDS Third NPRM/Tentative Decision that
it will permit both LMDS and Fixed Satellite Service ("FSS")
systems to operate in the 28 GHz frequency band. An Order in
response to these comments has not been released as of the pub-
lication of this article. Id.
41 Id. para. 27.
42 Id.
41 Id. para. 2. Services will include two-way radio, telecon-
technology, combined with the availability of broad-
band microwave spectrum, results in sufficient ca-
pacity in the proposed LMDS system designs to pro-
vide wireless competition to the LECs. 42  The
Commission determined that "[n]ew providers will
offer facilities-based competition to each other and
traditional cable and telephone carriers - greatly en-
hancing customer choice."'
Multipoint Distribution Service ("MDS"), or
"wireless cable," uses over-the-air microwave facili-
ties to transmit video programming." Wireless cable
is generally a microwave station transmitting on a
combination of MDS and Instructional Television
Fixed Service ("ITFS") channels to numerous re-
ceivers with antennas (e.g., residences, businesses,
government offices).' The Wireless Cable Associa-
tion International, Inc. estimates that there are 170
wireless cable systems in operation which serve ap-
proximately 700,000 homes, and experts predict that
wireless cable will at least double its current sub-
scriber base by the end of 1995. 4" A MDS auction,
the first auction of spectrum which will deliver
video, began on November 13, 1995.
47
The Commission allocated 153 MHz of spectrum
for PCS which is divided into three categories:
broadband, narrowband, and unlicensed.' PCS,
which is licensed on a nationwide, regional, Major
Trading Area ("MTA") and Basic Trading Area
("BTA") basis,'49 is distinct from other mobile ser-
vices, such as cellular networks, for several reasons.
ferencing, telemedia, telecommuting, date services, and global
networks. Id.
" In re Amendment of Parts 21 and 74 of the Commission's
Rules With Regard to Filing Procedures in the Multipoint Dis-
tribution Service and in the Instructional Television Fixed Ser-
vice and Implementation of Section 309(0) of the Communica-
tions Act, Report and Order, 10 FCC Red. 9589 (1995)
[hereinafter MDS Report and Order]. MDS includes single
channel MDS and Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Ser-
vice ("MMDS"). Id. para. 1 n.2. There are a maximum of 33
microwave channels used for wireless cable in each market: 13
MDS channels and the excess capacity on up to 20 ITFS chan-
nels. Id. para. 6.
45 Id. para. 7.
46 Id. para. 8 n.13 (citing Comments of Wireless Cable As-
sociation International, Inc., to the FCC Rcd. in MM Dkt. No.
94.341, PP Dkt. No. 93-253, at 6 (Jan. 9, 1995)).
4' FCC Auction Bidder Information Package, Multipoint
and/or Multichannel Distribution Service (MDS) - Authoriza-
tions for Basic Trading Areas, Nov. 13, 1995 (on file with au-
thor and available in Auctions Division, Wireless Telecommuni-
cations Bureau).
48 PCS Second Report and Order, supra note 37, paras. 54-
55.
49 RAND McNALLY 1995 COMMERCIAL ATLAS AND MAR-
KETING GUIDE (126th ed. 1995). The 51 MTAs and 487 BTAs
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PCS employs smaller cells than those of conventional
cellular systems and operates at higher frequencies
where there is less competition for spectrum.50 In ad-
dition, PCS networks have much greater system ca-
pacity and use less power."1 As a result, PCS phones
are smaller and less expensive than their conven-
tional cellular counterparts." Thus, PCS may be a
fierce competitor for existing cellular and local ex-
change providers, especially for individual consumers
who are not accustomed to phone portability from
cellular systems. Many PCS industry representatives
are optimistic about the numbers of customers who
will subscribe to PCS. Personal Communications In-
dustry Association ("PCIA") projected that by 2003
there could be nearly 31 million domestic PCS
subscribers."
In 1993, the Commission granted pioneer's prefer-
ences for companies to test PCS systems, one for
narrowband PCS at 900 MHz (granted June 24,
1993) and three for broadband PCS at 2 GHz
(granted December 23, 1993)."" The first PCS li-
censes already have been auctioned, and by the end
of the next decade, PCS is estimated to be a fifty
billion dollar industry, serving as many as 150 mil-
lion people world-wide and sixty million people in
the United States."
Wireless PBXs can be used to integrate a busi-
ness' wireline phones, pagers, cellular phones, wire-
less LANs, and other services. Thus, the major bene-
that divide this country into geographic regions were designed by
Rand McNally based on the natural flow of commerce. Rand
McNally is the copyright owner of the MTA/BTA listings.
Conditional use of Rand McNally's copyrighted material is au-
thorized under a blanket license agreement (dated Feb. 10,
1994). For PCS licensing purposes, the Commission added five
insular areas: Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, North-
ern Marina Islands, and American Samoa. In re Implementation
of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act - Competitive
Bidding, Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 2941, para. 28
(1994) [hereinafter Competitive Bidding Third Report and Or-
der). See also 47 C.F.R. § 24.102 (1995). The Commission split
Puerto Rico into two BTAs. See In re Amendment of the Com-
mission's Rules to Establish New Narrowband PCS, Second
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 4519, para. 1
(1994).
60 Garrison & Taylor, supra note 1, at 28.
' Id. Note also that
[c]ellular and enhanced specialized mobile radio service
(ESMR) providers in the 800 and 900 MHz bands are
currently developing microcell applications. Microcell
technology permits the deployment of cell sites that are
significantly smaller in their coverage area. With more
cell sites, frequencies can be reused more often, thus in-
creasing system capacity.
Barrett & Marchant, supra note 32, at 4.
52 Garrison & Taylor, supra note 1, at 28.
fit of wireless PBX will allow telephone portability
in office environments.5 6 The Commission has made
available two 20 MHz blocks on an unlicensed basis
(unlicensed PCS).5 7 Unlicensed PCS services are not
considered mobile services by the Commission. They
are designed for low-power, limited-range devices
owned and operated by end users on their own
premises." Services such as wireless LANs, wireless
PBX and PDAs are considered unlicensed PCS ser-
vices." One decisive factor in whether wireless ser-
vices will render wireline service providers obsolete
is the ability of wireless services to fully penetrate
the voice market by offering substitutable voice ser-
vices to business customers.60 Wireless PBXs, which
are capable of providing the internal switching ca-
pacity for many business networks, are now being
offered by most major telecommunications equip-
ment manufacturers and have the potential to even-
tually substitute for wireline networks for many
businesses."'
B. Wireless Services Auctions
In 1993, Congress authorized the Commission to
use competitive bidding to choose among mutually
exclusive applications for initial licenses for most
subscriber-based commercial wireless telecommuni-
cations services.6" To date, the Commission used
competitive bidding for narrowband PCS, broadband
53 Narses J. Colmenares, The FCC on Personal Wireless,
IEEE SPECTRUM, May 1994, at 39.
" In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish
New Narrowband Personal Communications Services, First Re-
port and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 7162, para. 3 (1993); In re
Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Per-
sonal Communications Services, Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, 9 FCC Rcd. 4957, para. 193 (1994). See also In re Amend-
ment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Narrowband
Personal Communications Services, Third Report and Order, 9
FCC Rcd. 1337, para. 7 (1994).
55 See FCC, BROADBAND PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS
SERVICES, VISITORS AUCTION GUIDE, at Tab VII, Tab VIII
(Dec. 5, 1994) [hereinafter VISITORS AUCTION GUIDE]. See also
Barrett & Marchant, supra note 32, at 8 (citing Kurt A. Wim-
mer, Global Development of Personal Communications Services,
COMM. LAW., Summer 1992, at 7).
e PCS Second Report and Order, supra note 37, para. 18.
' Id. para. 79.
56 Colmenares, supra note 53, at 41.
59 PCS Second Report and Order, supra note 37, para. 18.
60 Garrison & Taylor, supra note 1, at 28.
61 Id.
0' Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-66, § 6002(b), 107 Stat. 312 (1993)(amending the Commu-




PCS, and Interactive Video Data Service
("IVDS")." The Commission has also adopted com-
petitive bidding rules for 900 MHz SMR service"'
and MDS,68 and proposed competitive bidding rules
for services such as 800 MHz SMR Service,
66
LMDS,67 and 220 MHz Service.68 The Commission
has expeditiously moved forward in fulfilling the
Congressional mandates of "promoting economic
growth and enhancing access to telecommunications
service offerings for consumers, producers, and new
entrants," through the use of competitive bidding.69
The Commission allocated 120 MHz to broad-
band PCS, which is licensed in six bands. The A, B,
and C blocks (each block containing 30 MHz MTA
licenses), and the D, E, and F blocks (each block
containing 10 MHz BTA licenses).7 0 On December
08 See generally In re Implementation of Section 3090) of
the Communications Act - Competitive Bidding, Second Report
and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 2348 (1994) [hereinafter Competitive
Bidding Second Report and Order]; Competitive Bidding Third
Report and Order, supra note 49 (establishing rules for narrow-
band PCS); Fourth Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 2330
(1994)[hereinafter Competitive Bidding Fourth Report and Or-
derl(establishing rules for IVDS); Fifth Report and Order, 9
FCC Rcd. 5532 (1994) [hereinafter Competitive Bidding Fifth
Report and Order](establishing rules for Broadband PCS).
" In re Amendments of Parts 2 and 90 of the Commission's
Rules to Provide for the Use of 200 Channels Outside the Des-
ignated Filing Areas in the 896-901 MHz and the 935-940
MHz Bands Allotted to the Specialized Mobile Radio Pool, Sec-
ond Order on Reconsideration and Seventh Report and Order,
60 Fed. Reg. 48,913 (1995); see also In re Inquiry Relative to
the Future Use of the Frequency Band 806-960 MHz and
Amendments of Parts 2, 18, 21, 73, 74, 89, 91 and 93 of the
Rules Relative to Operations in the Land Mobile Service Be-
tween 806-960 MHz, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 51
F.C.C.2d 945, paras. 43, 67 (1975), aftd, NARUC v. FCC 525
F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976)
(establishing SMR service in 1974 as a commercial dispatch ser-
vice providing two-way voice communications on an allocated 14
MHz of spectrum in the 800 MHz band).
" MDS Report and Order, supra note 44. See also FCC
Auction Bidder Information Package, Multipoint and Mul-
tichannel Distribution Service (MMDS) Authorizations for Ba-
sic Trading Areas, Nov. 13, 1995.
00 In re Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission's Rules
to Facilitate Future Development of SMR Systems in the 800
MHz Frequency Band, Further Notice of Proposed Rule Mak-
ing, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,111 (1994)[hereinafter 800 MHz Further
Notice].
" LMDS Third NPRM/Tentative Decision, supra note 40,
paras. 35, 37.
" In re Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission's Rules
to Provide for the Use of the 220-222 MHz Band by the Private
Land Mobile Radio Service, Implementation of Sections 3(n)
and 332 of the Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of
Mobile Services, Implementation of Section 3090) of the Com-
munications Act- Competitive Bidding, Second Memorandum
Opinion and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
5, 1994, the Commission began an auction for
ninety-nine broadband PCS MTA licenses (broad-
band PCS A/B Block auction).71 Originally, the
Commission anticipated that three to six weeks
would be needed to complete the auction. However,
excluding holidays, the auction ran approximately
sixty-two business days. The auction closed on
March 13, 1995, after eighteen winning bidders7"
generated $7,019,303,797 in revenues for the United
States Treasury.73 The high bids for the top three
markets were: $442.7 million (New York, B license);
$493.5 million (Los Angeles, B license); and $385
million (Chicago, B license).7 4 Approximately three
months later, on June 23, 1995, the ninety-nine
broadband PCS licenses were granted.7 Winners of
these licenses propose to build out their systems rap-
PR Dkt. No. 89-552 (Aug. 28, 1995).
Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order, supra
note 63, at 3.
7' In re Amendment of Rules to Establish New Personal
Communications Services, GN Dkt No. 90-314, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 4957, para. 17 (1994).
7' The 99 licenses included two in each of the 51 MTAs
excluding the pioneers' preferences which were awarded in New
York, Washington/Baltimore and Los Angeles/San Diego. FCC
Grants 99 Licenses for Broadband PCS in Major Trading Ar-
eas, FCC NEWS, June 23, 1995, at I [hereinafter FCC Grants
99 Licenses]. The nationwide narrowband PCS auction had six
winning bidders for 10 nationwide licenses and raised a total of
$617 million. See Visitors Auction Guide, supra note 55. The
regional narrowband PCS auction had nine winning bidders for
30 regional licenses, six in each of the five geographic regions.
Id. Four of the winning bidders were designated entities. Infra,
note 85 and accompanying text.
78 Commercial Mobile Radio Service Information: Announc-
ing the Winning Bidders in the FCC's Auction of 99 Licenses to
Provide Broadband PCS in Major Trading Areas: Down Pay-
ments Due March 20, 1995, Public Notice (Mar. 13, 1995) (no-
tice declares that American Portable Telecommunications (8
markets), Ameritech Wireless Communications, Inc. (2), AT&T
Wireless PCS Inc. (21), BellSouth Personal Communications,
Inc. (2), Centennial Cellular Corp. (1), Communications Inter-
national Corp. (1), Cox Cable Communications, Inc. (1), GCI
Communications Corp. (1), GTE Macro Communication Corp.
(4), Pacific Telesis (2), PCS PrimeCo, L.P. (11), PhillieCo, L.P.
(1), Poka Lambro Telephone Cooperative, Inc. (2), Powertel
PCS Partners, L.P. (3), South Seas Satellite Communications
Corp. (1), Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. (3), Western
PCS Corporation (6), and WirelessCo, L.P. (29). AT&T Wire-
less PCS Inc., PCS Primeco, L.P., and WirelessCo, L.P. gained
the largest numbers of markets in the auction spending over a
billion dollars each. WirelessCo, L.P. paid the highest bill with
$2,110,079,168 for 29 licenses).
73 Id. This figure jumps to $7,736,020,384 when anticipated
payments for pioneers preference awards are included. Id.
7 I d. at 1 (Attach. A).
78 FCC Grants 99 Licenses, supra note 71, at 1. The Com-
mission noted the A/B Block licenses took 83 days to grant
which signified a "significant increase in speed of licensing in
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idly, offering service as early as the fall of 1996.7
Not all winners of the broadband PCS A and B
block licenses will be direct competitors of the domi-
nant LEC in any given region because many LECs
are involved in the provision of PCS service. Unlike
cellular service, the Commission did not impose sep-
arate subsidiary requirements on LECs who wish to
provide PCS. The Commission only required LECs
who planned to commence with PCS service to "im-
plement an acceptable plan for nonstructural safe-
guards against discrimination and cross-subsidiza-
tions."' At least one such plan has already been
filed by Pacific Bell Mobile Services ("PBMS"), a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Pacific Bell, to ensure
that regulated revenues will not subsidize PCS ser-
vice, and that interconnection service will be pro-
vided in a non-discriminatory manner.
C. Obstacles to the Rapid Implementation of PCS
Of the six blocks allocated to broadband PCS, 8
the C block contains 30 MHz licenses and the F
block contains 10 MHz licenses." Blocks C and F
are currently limited to bidders that qualify as "en-
trepreneurs." 80 Obstacles to effective competition for
both potential (C, D, E, and F block auction partici-
pants) and existing (A/B block auction winners)
comparison to the initial licensing of cellular telephone services."
Id. NABOB filed a petition to defer all A/B block auction li-
censes. The Commission denied the petition in a separate order
also released on June 23, 1995. In re Deferral of Licensing of
MTA Commercial Broadband PCS, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1209 (1995). In separate orders
adopted June 23, 1995, the Commission denied the Petitions to
Deny filed against individual A and B block auction winners. In
re Application of Pacific Telesis Mobile Services for a License to
Provide Broadband PCS Service on Block B in the Los Angeles-
San Diego Major Trading Area (M002), Order, DA 95-1413
(June 23, 1995); In re Application of Wireless Co., L.P. for a
License to Provide Broadband PCS Service on Block A in the
San Francisco Major Trading Area (M004), Order, DA 95-
1412 (June 23, 1995); In re Application of Pacific Telesis Mo-
bile Services for a License to Provide Broadband PCS Service on
Block B in the San Francisco Major Trading Area (MOOS), Or-
der, DA 95-1412 (June 23, 1995); In re Application of AT&T
Wireless PCS for a License to Provide Broadband PCS Service
on Block A in the Boston Major Trading Area (M008), Order,
DA 95-1412 (June 23, 1995); In re Application of WirelessCo,
L.P. for a License to Provide Broadband PCS Service on Block
B in the Boston Major Trading Area (M008), Order, DA 95-
1412 (June 23, 1995).
16 Motorola and AT&T Win $1-Billion PCS Contract
From Primeco, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 5, 1995. Winning bidders
have already awarded contracts to build out their networks. Id.
On September 1, 1995, AT&T and Motorola won a near-equal
share of a $1 billion contract "to build an 11-market wireless
PCS licensees have recently become apparent. These
problems create the possibility of slowing service to
the public and include: the stay of the C block auc-
tion (for potential C block auction winners); prohibi-
tions on fixed uses of PCS spectrum; and the costs of
microwave user relocation.
1. The C Block Auction
Prior to the broadband PCS A/B Block auction,
on November 23, 1994, the Commission released the
Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order8' in the
Competitive Bidding Docket. This order revised
some of the complex designated entity rules for
Broadband PCS that were promulgated in previous
Orders in the competitive bidding proceeding. 2 The
designated entity rules, as they have been defined,
were designed to fulfill the Congressional mandate of
providing opportunities for small businesses, rural
telephone companies, and businesses owned by mem-
bers of minority groups and women. Providing for
these entities will ensure a diverse group of appli-
cants participating in broadband PCS. 3 The second
broadband PCS auction, the C block auction, 8' was
designed to provide these opportunities for desig-
nated entities and entrepreneurs." In order to qual-
ify to enter the auction, potential bidders must cer-
network for PCS PrimeCo." Id. at 1. PCS PrimeCo has a late-
1996 launch date. Id.
" PCS Second Report and Order, supra note 37, para. 115
n.96.
7 In re Amendment of Rules to Establish New Personal
Communications Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9
FCC Rcd. 4957, para. 27 (1994).
79 Id.
So See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
*" In re Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communi-
cations Act-Competitive Bidding, Fifth Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 403 (1994) [hereinafter Competitive
Bidding Fifth MO&O].
6" Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order, supra
note 63; Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order, supra
note 63.
"' The statute provides in pertinent part:
promoting economic opportunity and competition and en-
suring that new and innovative technologies are readily
accessible to the American people by avoiding excessive
concentration of licenses and by disseminating licenses
among a wide variety of applicants, including small busi-
nesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses owned
by members of minority groups and women.
47 U.S.C. § 309()(3)(B)(1994).
0" The C block consisted of 493 broadband PCS licenses in
the 30 MHz band. See Competitive Bidding Fifth Report & Or-
der, supra note 63, para. 6.
" The term "designated entities" refers to small businesses,
19961
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tify compliance with financial caps. Only entities
qualifying as entrepreneurs were permitted to enter
the auction."' In addition, special provisions such as
bidding credits were provided for qualifying desig-
nated entities. Initially these designated entities in-
cluded small businesses, members of minority
groups, and women."7
The C block auction was originally scheduled to
begin on April 17, 1995, or thirty days after the
completion of the A/B block auction, whichever
came later. On January 6, 1995, Telephone Elec-
tronics Corporation ("TEC") filed an "Emergency
Motion for Stay" (hereinafter "Emergency Motion")
asking the Commission to stay its Competitive Bid-
ding Fifth Report and Order8s and Competitive Bid-
ding Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Orders9 to
the extent necessary to enable TEC to participate in
the C block auction.90 At the same time, TEC chal-
lenged the Orders containing the rules for the C
block auction in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit on the grounds
that the provisions for designated entities were un-
constitutional."' On February 10, 1995, the Com-
mission denied TEC's Emergency Motion. The Cir-
cuit Court, however, stayed the C block auction on
rural telephone companies, and businesses owned by members of
minority groups and women. 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(n),
332(c)(1)(1994). The term "entrepreneurs" refers to applicants
for the C Block auction that have "gross revenues of less than
$125 million in each of the last 2 years and total assets of less
than $500 million at the time the FCC Form 175 is filed for the
C Block auction." See 47 C.F.R. § 24.709(a)(1995).




88 Competitive Bidding Fifth MO&O, supra note 81.
90 In re Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communi-
cations Act-Competitive Bidding, Emergency Motion for Stay of
Telephone Electronics Corp., in PP Dkt. No. 93-253 (Jan. 6,
1995).
" Petition for Review, Telephone Elec. Corp. v. FCC, No.
95-1015 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
" Grant of Motion to Stay, Telephone Elec. Corp. v. FCC,
No. 95-1015 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
98 In re Partitioning Plan of Bay Springs Telephone Com-
pany, PCS Primeco, L.P. and Peterson County Communica-
tions, L.P., Declaratory Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 6633 (Apr. 18,
1995). The Commission approved a partitioning plan that would
allow Bay Springs Telephone Company (a subsidiary of TEC)
to provide PCS service in part of the New Orleans/Baton Rouge
MTA that was won in the A/B Block auction by PCS PrimeCo.
The partitioning plan satisfied the Commission's rules because
Bay Springs is a rural telephone company 47 C.F.R. § 24.720(e)
(1995), and the requirements of 47 C.F.R.
§ 24.714(d)(1995)have been met.
", Telephone Elec. Corp. v. FCC, No. 95-1015 (D.C. Cir.
March 15, 1995, two days after the close of the A/B
block auction.' The auction was rescheduled for
August 2, 1995, after the Commission and TEC
reached a settlement,9" and the stay was lifted. 4
On June 12, 1995, just three days before applica-
tions to participate in the auction were due a second
time (FCC Form 175s or short-forms), the Supreme
Court ruled in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia'
that federal affirmative action programs must with-
stand a strict scrutiny judicial standard of review. In
light of the Adarand decision, the Commission post-
poned the short-form filing date." On June 23,
1995, the Commission announced August 29, 1995
as the rescheduled date for the C block auction.'
Additionally, the Commission issued a Further No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making soliciting comment on
proposed changes to the competitive bidding rules for
the C block Auction that would address the legal un-
certainties raised by the Adarand decision.'
In response to the Competitive Bidding Further
Notice, several commenters suggested ways in which
the Commission could develop a supplemental record
to assist in justifying the designated entity provi-
sions." A new short form filing date and auction
1995).
95 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
" FCC Sets August 29th Auction Date for 493 BTA Li-
censes Located in the C Block for Personal Communications
Services in the 2 GHz Band, Public Notice (June 23,
1995)[hereinafter Auction Date]. See, e.g., Request for Com-
ments in 800 MHz SMR Proceeding, Public Notice (July 25,
1995).
9 Auction Date, supra note 96.
09 In re Implementation of Section 309(0) of the Communi-
cations Act - Competitive Bidding, Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,201 (1995) [hereinafter Competi-
tive Bidding Further Notice]. In the Competitive Bidding Fur-
ther Notice, the Commission proposed to eliminate all gender-
and race-based provisions contained in the competitive bidding
rules for the C Block auction to avoid delay that may be caused
by legal challenges to the existing rules that would likely result
from Adarand, but emphasized that its goal of providing oppor-
tunity for women and minorities in the PCS industry remained
unchanged. The Commission determined that special provisions
for minorities and women were constitutional under the "inter-
mediate scrutiny" standard of review articulated in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990). In
Metro Broadcasting, the Court held that Congressionally man-
dated minority programs (even if not remedial in the sense of
being designed to compensate victims of past governmental or
societal discrimination) "[we]re constitutionally permissible to
the extent that they serve important governmental objectives
within the power of Congress and are substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." Id.
99 In re Implementation of Section 309() of the Communi-
cations Act - Competitive Bidding, Race & Gender Based Provi-
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date were set.100 On July 18, 1995, the Commission
released the Sixth Report and Order in the competi-
tive bidding docket.1 'O This Order revised the C
block auction rules to make them neither race nor
gender-specific as the Competitive Bidding Further
Notice had proposed.
In addition, the 49.9% equity option for attracting
investment was extended to all bidders.' 2 Again, on
July 27th, two days before the short forms were due,
the D.C. Circuit granted a stay of the FCC's
amended equity structure rules for the C block auc-
tion (e.g., the provision of 49.9% equity option to all
C block applicants) this time to Omnipoint Corpora-
tion ("Omnipoint")."'0 The auction was stayed in-
definitely pending the outcome of the case.1 0 4 Oral
arguments were held on September 28, 1995 in the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and the court dis-
solved the stay that was granted to Omnipoint.' 0 1 In
light of the court's action, the Commission an-
nounced that the C block auction would commence
on December 11, 1995.10
On October 18, 1995, the United States Court of
sions for Auctioning C Block Broadband Personal Communica-
tions Services Licenses, Sixth Report and Order, 60 Fed. Reg.
37,786, 37,796, 37,799, 37,800 (1995) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. §§ 24.715, 24.716, 24.717) [hereinafter Competitive Bid-
ding Sixth Report and Order].
100 FCC Seeks Comment on Changes to C Block Auction
Rules for Broadband PCS, FCC NEWS, June 23, 1995, at 2.
The short-form filing date was set for July 28, 1995, five busi-
ness days after the rules were published in the Federal Register.
Id.
10 Competitive Bidding Sixth Report and Order, supra note
99.
102 Id.
101 Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, No. 95-1374 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
104 Id.
105 FCC Sets Auction Date of December 11, 1995 for 493
BTA Licenses Located in the C Block for Personal Communica-
tions Services in the 2 GHz Band, Public Notice (Sept. 29,
1995).
106 Id.
'0 FCC v. Radiophone, 116 S. Ct. 283, 283 (1995). See also
U.S. Supreme Court dissolves Sixth Circuit Stay of C Block
Auction: C Block Auction to Proceed on Schedule, Public Notice
(Oct. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Sixth Cir. Stay].
108 Id.
100 One of the problems the Commission faces is providing a
record to demonstrate specific acts of discrimination as required
under a strict scrutiny test. Because PCS is a new service, there
is no documentation as to how minorities and women have been
affected in this service. One possibility is an industry-wide
"Croson study." See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 491, 500, 509 (1989). Croson requires that a governmental
unit seeking to use race or gender criteria would need to estab-
lish: (1) discrimination against persons in the class of individuals
to be assisted by the program; (2) government participation in
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit once again stayed the
C Block Auction. On October 25, 1995, Justice Ste-
vens, Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit, vacated
the stay after finding that "the harm to the public
caused by a nationwide postponement of the auction
would outweigh the possible harm to Radiofone."' '
On October 30, 1995, the full United States Su-
preme Court declined to overturn Justice Stevens'
Order dissolving the Sixth Circuit's stay.' 08 Thus,
the short form applications were due November 6,
1995 and the auction was set to commence on De-
cember 11, 1995. The auction rules now offer special
provisions to all small businesses, including those
small businesses owned by members of minority
groups and women, to avoid the problem of having
to tailor them to a strict scrutiny standard. 9
The primary concerns for would-be C block licen-
sees are the headstart afforded to A and B block op-
erators who have already begun construction on net-
works, which will be functional by mid-1996," 0 and
the litigation uncertainty which may cause potential
investors to turn down investment opportunities."'
the discrimination, or passive participation in the otherwise es-
tablished discrimination; (3) consideration of non-race or gender-
based alternatives, remedies and the reasons for their rejection;
and (4) evidence sufficient to focus a remedy with a limited du-
ration to benefit groups experiencing discrimination and to mini-
mize adverse impact on those affected by the remedy. Id. How-
ever, this project would be time consuming and expensive.
110 See, e.g., In re Deferral of Licensing of MTA Commer-
cial Broadband PCS, Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7780 (Apr. 12, 1995)
[hereinafter First Deferral Order]. The Commission noted that
auctioning the A and B blocks first would "in fact provide desig-
nated entities with important information about the value of
PCS licenses that would assist them in attracting capital and for-
mulating bid strategies." Id. para. 4. Moreover, the Commission
noted that the "overriding public interest in rapid introduction of
service outweighed the risk of A and B block winners gaining a
headstart advantage." Id. The Commission responded to a peti-
tion requesting the Commission defer licensing the A and B
blocks by declining to defer licensing. See Competitive Bidding
Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 6858
(1994) (affirming that the Commission always intended to em-
ploy a sequence of auctions to license broadband PCS). The
Commission received two pleadings in opposition to the First
Deferral Order and seeking a stay of the A and B block license
grants (CommOne and Go Communications, filing jointly;
NAACP, NABOB and Percy Sutton, filing jointly). The Com-
mission again declined to defer licensing. See In re Deferral of
Licensing of MTA Commercial Broadband PCS, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 78
Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1209 (June 23, 1995) [hereinafter Second
Deferral Order].
. Indeed, the fear of litigation was one of the reasons cited
by commenters responding to the Competitive Bidding Further
Notice in light of Adarand who, even though they could qualify
for the special provisions, stated that the Commission should
eliminate all preferences for minorities and women and hold the
1996]
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Early market entrants potentially will gain an ad-
vantage by catching the customer base that currently
has an unfilled need for integrated wireless services.
Although the question of who the major PCS players
will be is still unresolved, time is of the essence, and
C block licensees may be playing catch-up to major
companies who will have already infiltrated the local
exchange market. The Commission's decision to
eliminate race and gender-based preferences was
based in part on the idea that this action would
avoid another stay of the auction which would di-
minish the ability of designated entities to compete if
and when they won licenses. 112 If this is the case, the
public may benefit from rapid implementation of
PCS service, but also lose, because the service prov-
iders will be the same few major telecommunications
companies who already control other services in the
local exchange market and who have won A/B block
licenses. Even post-Adarand, FCC Chairman Reed
E. Hundt stated:
[the C block auction] offers the greatest opportunity this
country has ever known to get small, women and minor-
ity-owned businesses in on the ground floor of an emerg-
ing industry. Although Adarand has caused us to reevalu-
ate some of our auction rules in light of the Supreme
Court's decision, we still believe that the auction repre-
sents a unique opportunity for all of us."'
Although the stay of the C block auction will not
affect the provision of PCS services by A/B block
auction winners, it may affect the diversity and num-
ber of companies that compete with BOCs for local
exchange market customers. "The Commission re-
mains committed to diversifying ownership in the
telecommunications industry in .. .emerging tech-
nologies, where the Commission believes that en-
trepreneurial opportunity in new industries is likely
to be dominated by established firms, to the longer
run detriment of the industry and the economy as a
auction for small businesses only. See, e.g., Letter from Sandra
Goeken Martis to Cathy Sandoval, Office of Communications
Business Opportunities, FCC (June 16, 1995)(on file with au-
thor); Letter from Curtis White to Regina M. Keeney, Chief,
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, FCC (June 20, 1995)(on
file with author); Letter from C. Steven Lucero to Regina M.
Keeney, Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, FCC and
Kathleen O'Brien Ham, Chief Auctions Division, FCC (June
20, 1995)(on file with author); Competitive Bidding Sixth Re-
port and Order, supra note 99, para. I n.3.
112 Competitive Bidding Further Notice, supra note 98, at 7.
"1 Chairman Reed E. Hundt, Speech to Minority Business
Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund (June 13, 1995).
11, FCC, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REVIEW, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT § 11.1 (1995).
.. Sixth Cir. Stay, supra note 107.
whole. 1 1 1 4 If the Commission is committed to
preventing the PCS industry from being dominated
by established firms, it will have to act expeditiously
to ensure that the C block auction gets underway.
One opportunity, deferring grant of licenses won in
the A/B block auction, has passed, despite numerous
requests for license deferral both before and after li-
censing was complete.' The ramifications of the de-
lay in the C block auction remain to be seen.
2. Prohibition on the Provision of Fixed Services
Despite the delay of the C block auction, PCS
promises to change the face of local exchange. A/B
block auction winners recognize that part of the suc-
cess of PCS service will be determined by the type of
service PCS providers will be permitted to provide.
Several parties have requested that the Commission
clarify that PCS providers will be permitted to pro-
vide integrated fixed services along with their wire-
less offerings." 6 Section 24.3 of the Commission's
rules provides the language addressing fixed uses.
Section 24.3 allows PCS licensees to use fixed ser-
vices only to the extent that the fixed use is ancillary
to the mobile operations they provide.' 7 At this
time, the Commission has not defined the term "an-
cillary" in this context." 8 Thus, PCS licensees are
uncertain as to the extent that fixed services will be
considered ancillary to mobile operations.
The Commission noted, in adopting Section 24.3
of the rules, that the limited amount of spectrum al-
located to PCS was available to meet the primary
purpose of serving people who demand mobile ser-
vices, and that the need for fixed services can gener-
ally be accommodated in other frequency bands or
through other media." 9
The Commission stated, in a response to an in-
quiry concerning the use of fixed service in PCS,
"' See, e.g., Letter from A. Thomas Carroccio, Esq. to Re-
gina M. Keeney, Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
(Nov. 7, 1994)(on file with author).
"1 Section 24.3 provides, in pertinent part, that PCS licen-
sees may provide any mobile communications service on their
assigned spectrum. Fixed services may be provided only on an
ancillary basis to mobile operations. 47 C.F.R. § 24.3 (1994).
118 Section 20.7 of the Commission's rules defines mobile
services within the meaning of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 155(n), 332, including "aux-
iliary services provided by mobile service licensees, and ancillary
fixed communications offered by personal communications ser-
vice providers." 47 C.F.R. § 20.7(g)(1994). Note, however, the
term "ancillary" is not defined.
'1 PCS Second Report and Order, supra note 37, para. 7.
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that it expressly intended the definition of PCS to be
sufficiently inclusive to accommodate a wide range of
services and technologies, including new and creative
applications.' The Commission anticipates that
PCS will be provided by a variety of technologies
and will be integrated into, and work with, compet-
ing networks.12' The question then becomes whether
"integrated" can be used interchangeably with "an-
cillary" for the purpose of fixed service use. It is un-
likely that a PCS provider will attempt to establish a
traditional "fixed" network similar to the wireline
exchange, therefore PCS providers should be given
the flexibility to use fixed services in whatever capac-
ity they need to provide the best possible PCS service
to consumers.' Although, it seems that the Com-
mission may be leaning towards interpreting Section
24.3 of the rules in this way. '2 The Commission
currently requires PCS licensees to seek a waiver to
demonstrate that a fixed service best meets the de-
mands of the service area.'
2 4
The Commission can reasonably expect several
waiver requests from wireless service providers who
need to integrate fixed use into their systems in order
to fulfill the needs of consumers. An interpretation of
Section 24.3 of the rules allowing broad flexibility in
the provision of fixed services would be in the public
interest, because it would allow PCS providers to use
all available forms of technology to develop their sys-
tems without having to worry about whether the sys-
tems will come into compliance with the Commis-
sion's "fixed service" rules. This flexibility would
help make PCS more competitive with landline
LEGs because the service would be more compara-
ble. Nevertheless, the Commission has yet to clarify
120 Letter from Regina M. Keeney, Chief, Wireless Tele-
communications Bureau to Thomas A. Carroccio, Esq. (Nov. 15,
1994) [hereinafter Carroccio Response].
121 Id.
12 PCS providers would use fixed stations to enable trans-
mitters to be placed on residences and businesses to then trans-
mit mobile radio signals to PCS devices.
128 Carroccio Response, supra note 120.
13 In re Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred
from Federal Government Use, First Report and Order and Sec-
ond Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 4769, para.
20 (1995) [hereinafter First R&O and Second NPRM]. In the
same rulemaking, the Commission is proposing to designate the
4669-4685 band for any fixed or mobile service use, without re-
quiring waivers for fixed use. The Commission designated pro-
posed service offerings (e.g., dispatch service, mobile auxiliary
broadcast operations, wireless local loop services) as General
Wireless Communications Services ("GWCS"). Id.
1.. PCS Second Report and Order, supra note 37, para. 88.
128 In re Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innova-
tion in the Use of New Telecommunications Technologies, First
this issue even as providers begin to build out PCS
systems. The answer the Commission provides will
define the shape that PCS will take, and possibly the
success of competition in the local loop from this
service.
3. Microwave Relocation
The spectrum allocation for broadband (and unli-
censed) PCS was a reallocation of fixed point-to-
point microwave service frequencies.' 25  In the
Emerging Technologies Docket,' 2 6 the Commission
established a two-stage process for relocation of mi-
crowave incumbents currently operating on 2 GHz
frequencies allocated to licensed broadband PCS.'"
The first phase is a two-year voluntary negotiation
period (three years for public safety incumbents)
during which PCS licensees may negotiate with mi-
crowave incumbents regarding relocation, but incum-
bents are not required to relocate. The second phase
is a one-year mandatory negotiation period (two
years for public safety incumbents) during which the
microwave incumbent must agree to relocation pro-
vided the PCS licensee meets its relocation obliga-
tions under the rules. 2 The two-year voluntary ne-
gotiation period for 2 GHz microwave incumbents
operating in the broadband PCS "A" and "B"
blocks began on April 5, 1995, the date that the A/B
block auction winners filed their long-form applica-
tions."'29 Negotiation over relocation of microwave
users may take much longer than was originally an-
ticipated, and controversy over the best way to han-
dle the process has already occurred. 8 0 The Com-
mission received a Petition for Rulemaking
Report and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7
FCC Rcd. 6886 (1992).
127 Id.
128 In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish
New Personal Communications Services, Fourth Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7955 (1995). The Commis-
sion amended negotiation procedures for mandatory relocation of
existing microwave facilities to provide for the use of indepen-
dent estimates of the cost to replace an existing facility in resolv-
ing a dispute between licensees of existing facilities and new ser-
vice providers. Id.
1"9 Wireless Bureau Announces Initiation of Voluntary Ne-
gotiation Period for A and B Block PCS Licensees and 2 GHz
Incumbent Microwave Licensees, Public Notice (Apr. 19, 1995).
Accordingly, the voluntary negotiation period for non-public
safety microwave licensees in the A and B blocks expires on
April 5, 1997. Id.
For public safety microwave licensees operating in the A and
B blocks, the three year voluntary negotiation period expires on
April 5, 1998. Id.
'o Phillips Luncheon Speech, supra note 4. Chairman
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regarding a plan for sharing the costs of microwave
relocation. 13 PBMS stated that its goal in develop-
ing the plan is to "create an equitable cost sharing
plan that avoids controversial determinations such as
direct cost versus premium cost, degree of interfer-
ence, and 'benefit' of relocation. '"I" Instead of sepa-
rating direct and premium costs, PBMS proposes to
depreciate relocation costs so that later entrants do
not obtain a smaller cost.' 33
On October 13, 1995, the Commission released a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposing a plan for
sharing the costs of relocating microwave facilities
operating on the 2 GHz band. The proposal is based
on the PBMS proposal as modified by the Personal
Communications Industry Association ("PCIA")."
Although microwave relocation has not yet sur-
faced as an insurmountable problem, like the C
block auction delay, it threatens to affect smaller
PCS providers the most. Frankly, larger companies
with deep pockets, although they are likely to engage
in vigorous negotiation, can afford to relocate any
and all incumbents on their spectrum. As the situa-
tion currently exists, although several PCS licensees
may benefit from the relocation of a microwave link,
there is no mechanism in place to share the cost
among those who benefit - creating a potential "free
rider" problem. Relocation may be more of an issue
for small PCS companies, especially given the capital
intensive nature of actually building out the PCS
system. Certainly all potential PCS providers knew
about the incumbent microwave users when bidding
for spectrum began. Nevertheless, the outcome of the
rulemaking allowing costs to be shared could poten-
tially benefit smaller providers more than larger
companies. However, if the Commission requires the
first PCS providers to locate on a spectrum block to
Hundt stated that "[elven though relocation is in its earliest
stages, we are hearing a growing number of complaints from
participants . . . ." Id. Chairman Hundt noted that the Commis-
sion expects to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking address-
ing a petition for rulemaking that PCS industry members have
filed requesting permission for PCS licensees to share the costs
of relocating incumbents. Id. The Chairman made clear that the
Commission's goal continues to be "facilitat[ing] the fastest pos-
sible rollout of PCS services to the American public, while pro-
tecting the
rights of incumbent occupants of the PCS spectrum." Id.
13 In re Petition for Rulemaking of Pacific Bell Mobile Ser-
vices Regarding a Plan for Sharing the Costs of Microwave Re-
location, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 60 Fed. Reg. 55,529
(1995).
"I Id. at ii.
13 Id.
134 In re Amendment to the Commission's Rules Regarding
a Plan for Sharing the costs of Microwave Relocation, Notice of
continue paying all relocation costs, this will cause
more harm to smaller providers than larger ones.
III. COMMISSION'S CURRENT REGULA-
TORY POSITION ON COMPETITION IN
THE LOCAL LOOP
As discussed in Part II of this article, the Com-
mission is faced with several decisions (i.e., handling
the C block auction, permissible fixed use clarifica-
tion and microwave relocation costs) that will, in
large part, determine how inclusive the group of new
generation wireless service providers will be. Re-
gardless of how inclusive the PCS providers group
becomes, the Commission indicated an interest in
promoting competition to LECs in the form of a
"wireless local loop" and indicated that wireless lo-
cal loop service could replace the "last mile" to the
home with a radio link. " 5 The Commission stated
that "[its] intention is to foster a market environment
in which cellular and PCS licensees compete with a
variety of telecommunications services" and it has
taken action concerning PCS and in other proceed-
ings to promote competition. " 6 For example, PCS
licensees can use their spectrum to provide any type
of mobile service which allows them to respond more
effectively to market demand than to other commer-
cial mobile radio service ("CMRS") providers (be-
cause other allocations tend to be for a specific type
of service such as telephone or paging). Additionally,
the Commission concluded that it has a significant
interest in promoting the nationwide availability of
number portability because this will, in turn, pro-
mote competition in the local exchange and the inter-
Proposed Rulemaking, Dkt. No. 95-157 (Oct. 13, 1995).
185 PCS Second Report and Order, supra note 37, para. 8
n.11. See also In re Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz
Transferred from Federal Government Use, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 9 FCC Rcd. 6779, para. 13 (1994)(allocating the
2300-2310 and 2390-2400 MHz bands for use in providing
wireless local loop service). Ultimately the Commission did not
allocate the spectrum for wireless local loop service because of
the Amateur Service used currently on the frequency band. The
Commission reasoned that wireless local loop service could be
provided in spectrum allocated for broadband PCS in the 1850-
1990 MHz band. See In re Allocation of Spectrum Below 5
GHz Transferred from Federal Government Use, First Report
and Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 4769,
para. 20 (1995).
"" In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish
New Personal Communications Services, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and Tentative Decision, 7 FCC Rcd. 5676, para.
70 (1992) [hereinafter NPRM/Tentative Decision].
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state telecommunications markets. 3 7 In the CMRS
proceeding, the Commission recognized that
"[t]echnology and consumer demand, facilitated by
[its] general policy not to restrict the services that can
be provided over any particular band, are prompting
commercial service providers to follow marketing
strategies that blur the differences between the vari-
ous services comprising the wireless marketplace."' 38
The Commission also noted that the distinction be-
tween services (such as voice and data) are disap-
pearing, primarily because service providers are at-
tempting to meet the demand of their customers for
"one-stop shopping" (defined as the ability to buy a
mixture of different mobile services from one
carrier)." 9
A. Recognizing Competition in Local Markets
In several recent proceedings, the Commission
demonstrated its willingness to recognize that compe-
tition currently exists in the local exchange market.
For example, the Commission recently granted
Nynex a waiver of access charge rules." 0 Nynex re-
quested a waiver of Parts 61 and 69 of the Commis-
sion's rules to permit it to use different methods for
assessing access charges."" Nynex favored a compre-
hensive reform of the access charge and jurisdictional
separation rules, claiming that "the existing rules
impose special hardships upon Nynex because of the
107 In re Telephone Number Portability, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, CC Dkt. No. 95-116, para. 29 (July 13, 1995).
"0 In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the
Communications Act, Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd.
7988, para. 56 (1994) [hereinafter CMRS Third Report and
Order].
189 Id.
140 In re Nynex Telephone Companies Petition for Waiver,
Transition Plan to Preserve Universal Service in a Competitive
Environment, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd.
7445 (1995) [hereinafter Nynex Waiver Order].
14 Id. para. 1.
142 Id.
148 Id.
14 In re Rochester Telephone Corporation Petition for
Waivers to Implement Its Open Market Plan, Order, 10 FCC
Rcd. 6776 (1995) [hereinafter Rochester Petition] (granting
Rochester Telephone a waiver of Part 69 of the rules, enabling
it to recover three types of access charges: the subscriber line
charge, the common carrier line charge, and the charge for
changing a presubscribed interexchange carrier). Rochester
Telephone characterizes this new form as better suited to its new
structure, having recently organized itself to facilitate local ex-
change competition in and around Rochester, New York. Fur-
thermore, this new form facilitates a competitive local market-
place. Id. US West requested a similar waiver to enable it to
provide unbundled common lines. The Commission sought com-
competitive market conditions" in a particular area
in New York. " 2 The Commission concluded that
"competitive developments in LATA 132, which
comprises the New York City metropolitan area,
[justified] a waiver. ' " 3 One Commissioner issued a
separate statement in this proceeding to reiterate that
the Commission "also [sought] to encourage competi-
tion in local telephone services. The waivers [the
Commission] granted last month for Rochester Tele-
phone represented one modest contribution on [the
Commission's] part to the development of a more
competitive local telephone marketplace."' Today's
action is another timely step forward."" 6 The Com-
mission noted that state authorities are also moving
toward creating competition in local exchange ser-
vices. " " New York and Illinois are two states lead-
ing the effort to increase competition in the local ex-
change market, and others are following suit."
7
For example, "AT&T is testing local service in
Rochester, NY."" 8 Surprisingly, within a couple of
weeks after the AT&T plan was implemented,
"3,000 customers signed up, quickly growing to
7,000 converts."" 9 AT&T's local service was ten
percent cheaper than the local monopoly's and one
customer stated, "AT&T calls constantly to see if
I'm happy. I didn't hear a peep from the phone com-
pany for 23 years."' 50 If this response is any indica-
tion of customer sentiment, LECs may need to start
paying more attention to customers now, before
ment on the request. See also Pleading Cycle Established for
Comments on US West's Petition for Waiver of Commission's
Rules to Establish Unbundled Common Lines, Public Notice
(July 8, 1995).
"0 Nynex Waiver Order, supra note 140, para. 4 (Separate
Statement of Commissioner Susan Ness, stating that,"[o]ur deci-
sion today is testimony to the importance of cooperation in the
construction of a competitive framework.").
'46 Rochester Petition, supra note 144. For example, the
New York City Public Service Commission ("NYPSC") permit-
ted competition in the provision of local exchange service. The
NYPSC has certified new competitive entrants as LECs and has
given them rights comparable to those of incumbent LECs such
as Nynex. Id.
"" Berniker, supra note 3, at 14. Cablevision Systems Corp.
in Connecticut, "through its Cablevision Lightpath subsidiary,
has applied to Connecticut regulators to offer phone service in
the state." Id. Wilt Hildenbrand, vice president of technology,
Cablevision systems Corp., stated "[s]tructurally, we think we
can do it, but there's still a lot we have to learn about offering
residential telephone services." Id. Simultaneously, "Southern
New England Telephone, the leading telco in Connecticut, plans
to compete directly with cable operators in the state with video,
data and voice services." Id.





other companies get in on the ground floor. "Reach-
ing out to local communities, AT&T has installed
880 communications 'nodes' or local network points
nationwide, about five in each Bell calling area."15
In Illinois, Ameritech proposed opening its market
in exchange for entry into long distance."" In the
PCS proceeding, the Commission recognized that al-
lowing a few large entities to dominate PCS through
nationwide licenses could prove to be anticompetitive
and hinder the Commission's efforts to promote com-
petition in the local market.158 However, as previ-
ously discussed, several recent events indicate the
PCS market may indeed be dominated by a very few
"large entities."
B. Cellular/PCS Cross-ownership
The cellular/PCS cross-ownership rules were
designed to foster competition in the wireless services
market and to allow more than just the major tele-
communications companies to participate in wireless
services. PCS spectrum was originally allocated, in
part, to dissolve the duopoly created by the two-
player cellular system."" Although the cellular/PCS
cross-ownership rules may create a limited delay for
some A and B block winners in their efforts to estab-
lish PCS systems, thus creating more time for LECs
to prepare to compete, the rules are important to the
fair distribution of wireless services opportunities.
Several companies chose to divest before the auc-
tion, to gain bidding eligibility. Pacific Telesis con-
ducted a 1.5 billion dollar initial public offering
spin-off of the company's wireless communications
subsidiary, now called AirTouch Communica-
tions.155 Sprint Corporation ("Sprint"), a partner in
a PCS joint venture with WirelessCo, L.P., and
PhillieCo, L.P., holds twenty-nine PCS licenses and
151 Id. at A8.
'" Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment
on Ameritech's Petition for Partial Waiver of Section 22.903 of
the Commission's Rules, Public Notice (Oct. 19, 1995).
'5 NPRM/Tentative Decision, supra note 136.
104 Competition Report, supra note 29, para. 4.
'o Nina Schuyler, Untying Telesis: Heavily Regulated Pa-
cific Telesis Wants to Compete in New Markets. It's Up to
General Counsel to Make That Legal, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1994,
at 77.
156 47 C.F.R. § 24.204(0 (1994). See also In Re Request for
Expedited, Limited Waiver of Section 24.204 by WirelessCo,
L.P., PhillieCo, L.P. and Sprint Corporation, 10 FCC Rcd.
11,111 (1995) [hereinafter Sprint Waiver Request].
167 47 C.F.R. § 24.204(0(3) (1994). The Commission re-
quires that a PCS licensee with a controlling or attributable
ownership of cellular holdings in the same market must elimi-
must divest some of its cellular markets to comply
with the Commission's auction rules. Sprint recently
requested that the Commission grant a limited
waiver of the ninety day deadline for completion of
cellular divestiture set forth in Section 24.204(f) of
the Commission's rules."' PCS license winners can-
not hold more than a twenty percent interest in a
cellular provider that serves ten percent or more of
the population in a given MTA. 57 Unless the Com-
mission grants a waiver of the divestiture rules,
Sprint argued that it will have to reduce its market
ownership by 1.7 million pops'5 s in Dallas, Phila-
delphia, and Des Moines MTAs by September 21,
1995."' Sprint contended that a waiver would pre-
vent the delay of prompt introduction of PCS, there-
fore not granting a waiver would be contrary to the
public interest.'
The Commission granted a similar waiver request
to Cincinnati Bell Telephone Company ("CBT")
and, in doing so, stated that "Section 24.204 [was]
designed to increase the number of affiliated compet-
itors in each PCS market and to safeguard the com-
petitiveness of those markets . . . ."' However,
CBT's waiver differed from the Sprint request be-
cause it was filed prior to the auction and requested
permission to bid in the auction. CBT could not
divest prior to the auction because it was involved in
litigation in the Delaware Chancery Court, thus, the
timing of the resolution of this matter was beyond
CBT's control. The Commission denied CBT's addi-
tional request to retain its impermissible partnership
interests and unconditionally hold an in-market 30
MHz license," indicating the Commission's firm
belief that long-term cross-ownership of these two
competing wireless services would greatly reduce
competitive forces in any given market.
On September 21, 1995, the Commission granted
Sprint a waiver through September 21, 1996 to com-
nate any significant overlap between the PCS and cellular ser-
vice areas within 90 days of the grant of a PCS license. Id.
I" The term "pops" is defined as the population of the li-
cense service area. See, e.g., Competitive Bidding Fifth Report
and Order, supra note 63, para. 52 n.30.
"' Sprint Waiver Request, supra note 156, at i. Sprint has
requested one year, until September 21, 1996, to complete di-
vestiture. Id.
160 Id. at 17, 18.
161 In re Cincinnati Bell Telephone Company Petition for
Waiver of Section 24.204 of the Commission's Rules, Order, 9
FCC Rcd. 7658, para. 11 (1994)[hereinafter CBT Waiver Or-
der](granting CBT a waiver of Section 24.204 of the Commis-
sion's rules to allow CBT a limited amount of additional time to
divest its partnership interests to come into compliance with the
PCS/cellular cross-ownership rules).
162 Id. para 4.
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plete a spin-off of its cellular holdings to come into
compliance with the Commission's divestiture
rules. 163 The Commission conditioned the waiver
upon Sprint's submission of a plan to the wireless
Telecommunications Bureau's Commercial Wireless
Division within sixty days of the publication of the
Order in the Federal Register. The plan must
demonstrate how Sprint will achieve complete sepa-
ration between the activities of Sprint Cellular and
Sprint Telecom (the PCS subsidiary that is a partner
in WirelessCo, a PCS provider) in areas served by
Sprint Cellular."" The Commission granted the
waiver because it found "that grant of the waiver
would be in the public interest" and that "[a] spin-
off of the entire Sprint cellular company to its share-
holders is far more pro-competitive than the more
limited divestiture required by Section 24.204 of the
Commission's rules." 165
Radiofone, Inc., a cellular licensee in southeast
Louisiana, also filed a waiver request166 with the
Commission, requesting that the Commission waive
Sections 20.6167 and 24.204 of the rules to permit
Radiofone to participate in the upcoming C block
auction and bid on the three Louisiana BTAs in
which Radiofone and its affiliates provide cellular
service." Radiofone directly holds four cellular li-
censes in southeast Louisiana, and indirectly controls
some southeastern Louisiana licenses. 69 Thus, ab-
sent a waiver, if Radiofone were a successful bidder
in the C block auction, it would be in violation of
Section 24.204 of the Commission's, rules unless
Radiofone divested the required amount of cellular
spectrum.1 70 In addition, if Radiofone were to obtain
the BTAs of its choice, having 30 MHz of PCS
spectrum combined with its existing 25 MHz of cel-
lular spectrum in the same region would make Radi-
ofone in violation of Section 20.6 (the spectrum ag-
gregation cap).1 7 ' Radiofone contends that a waiver
Sprint Waiver Request, supra note 156.
16 Id. para. 20.
106 Id. para. 16.
'" Radiofone's request differs from Sprint's Request in one
crucial aspect - it requests a permanent waiver of the rules, as
opposed to an extension of time to divest its cellular interests.
See Letter from Lawrence D. Garvey to Rosalind K. Allen,
Chief, Commercial Radio Division, Wireless Telecommunica-
tions Bureau, FCC Uuly 27, 1995) [hereinafter Radiofone
Waiver Request].
167 Commercial Mobile Radio Services, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,953
(1995) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 20.6 (1995)) (establishing a
45 MHz spectrum cap for all broadband PCS, cellular and
SMR spectrum held by an entity).
' Radiofone Waiver Request, supra note 166.
169 Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment
on Request of Radiofone, Inc. for Waiver of Sections 20.6 and
would be. in the public interest because, inter alia,
Radiofone would be able to bring new technologies
to its customers in the southeastern Louisiana region
through its expertise in cellular service, and Radi-
ofone would be permitted to utilize the economies of
scale and scope that would be realized from provid-
ing PCS in areas where it currently provides cellular
service. 
7 1
C. Wireline Exchange in SMR Service
Recently, the Commission eliminated the prohibi-
tion on wireline telephone common carriers which
prevented them from holding or controlling SMR
and commercial 220 MHz licenses. 1 71 In addition,
the Commission eliminated its prohibition on the
provision of dispatch service by providers of CMRS,
including cellular licensees, other licensees in Public
Mobile Services, and PCS licensees.' 7 The prohibi-
tion on wireline carriers was intended to reduce in-
centives for wireline carriers to engage in discrimina-
tory interconnection. In repealing the prohibition,
the Commission stated that "wireline participation
would serve the public interest by promoting compe-
tition, lowering costs, and expanding consumer
choice."' 75 The Commission acknowledged that it
was "unaware of any pending complaints alleging
discriminatory interconnection filed by unaffiliated
cellular providers against wireline carriers with cel-
lular affiliates.' 1 7 The absence of complaints may
be interpreted as a showing of good faith that can be
imputed as wireline carriers pursue dispatch in the
future. By allowing wireline carriers to participate
in SMR and 220 MHz, the Commission indicated
that it is examining every aspect of telecommunica-
tions service to consider whether competition is being
promoted.
24.204 of the Commission's Rules, Public Notice (Aug. 3, 1995).
170 Id.
171 Id.
17, Radiofone Waiver Request, supra note 166.
"' In re Eligibility for the Specialized Mobile Radio Ser-
vices and Radio Services in the 220-222 MHz Land Mobile
Band and Use of Radio Dispatch Communications, Report and
Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 6280, para. 1 (Mar. 7, 1995) [hereinafter
Wireline Eligibility Order].
174 Id. para. 1 n.3.
176 Id. para. 18. LECs and LEC affiliates providing CMRS
are subject to the accounting safeguards in Part 64 of Commis-
sion's rules concerning cost allocations and affiliate transactions
and to the accounting requirements set forth in Part 32 of the
Commission's rules. Id. para. 23 n.75.
17' Id. para. 22.
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D. Competition in LMDS
In the LMDS proceeding, ' the Commission con-
sidered whether LECs should be permitted to be
LMDS licensees. ' Parties commenting in favor of
allowing LECs to participate in LMDS contend that
LEGs do not have monopoly power in the context of
LMDS and, therefore, should be given the opportu-
nity to provide LMDS service." 9 In addition, they
contend LEC participation would benefit the public
interest (i.e., resources and expertise would allow
LEGs to provide LMDS to the public rapidly).
180
Moreover, commenters argued that imposing restric-
tions would be beyond the Commission's author-
ity. 8 Parties opposed to permitting LEC participa-
tion in LMDS argued that "LECs would misuse
their resources and market power to preempt compe-
tition in both video and telecommunications services;
and that the Cable Act bars LECs from being li-
censed to provide LMDS."' 82
The Commission tentatively concluded that there
are no statutory or regulatory restrictions that pro-
hibit a LEC from holding an interest in a wireless
cable operator or LMDS licensee that does not oth-
erwise meet the statutory definition of a cable sys-
tem."8 ' The Commission concluded, and the D.C.
Circuit upheld the conclusion,"" that the telco-cable
cross-ownership ban does not apply to wireless cable
facilities.'8 In addition, the Commission asked for
comments on such issues as: (1) the extent this spec-
trum (allocated for LMDS) can be used to provide
service that is competitive with local telephone ser-
vice, particularly the provision of access services to
residential and business subscribers; and (2) the pos-
sibility that allowing a LEC to acquire LMDS li-
censes in its service area will eliminate a potential
and important new source of competition in the local
exchange market. The Commission goes on to ask
177 LMDS Third NPRM/Tentative Decision, supra note
40.
178 Id. para. 98.
,70 The Commission summarized the parties commenting in
favor of allowing LEG participation in LMDS as follows:
telephone companies should be given the opportunity to
integrate LMDS into their operations; that LEGs do not
possess any monopoly power with regard to LMDS and
that they would have no bottleneck market power through
provision of LMDS; that current statutes and regulations
do not bar LEG participation; that LEGs have resources,
expertise and public service commitment that would bene-
fit LMDS; and that imposing restrictions would be over-




whether, "[g]iven the LEGs current monopoly status
with regard to the provision of local exchange ser-
vice, would LEGs be likely to acquire LMDS spec-
trum as a means of forestalling competitive entry in
the local exchange market?"' 86 At least in this pro-
ceeding, the Commission is still basing its solicitation
of comments on "LEGs current monopoly status."'8 "
In contrast, the Commission's rulings in other
proceedings,' and indeed in the LMDS proceed-
ing,"89 have indicated the Commission's belief that
competition already exists in the local exchange, and
that competition is currently developing at a rapid
pace. However, the Commission's reference to
LEGs' "current monopoly status" may be an indica-
tion that the Commission is not yet ready to abandon
the monopoly theory entirely, at least until competi-
tion evolves from its current state. This situation cre-
ates the cyclical argument that competition cannot
evolve fully until the Commission recognizes that
competition currently exists. Therefore, LECs do not
enjoy monopoly status. As a solution, the Commis-
sion should eliminate regulatory barriers that pre-
vent BOCs from fully competing with new services.
"Incumbent LEGs seek deregulation as soon as com-
petition is allowed in order to have the flexibility to
compete ...[n]ew LECs argue entry only provides
the illusion of competition until the essential techni-
cal and economic prerequisites have been established
and effective competition emerges."' 9 Part of foster-
ing competition includes allowing LECs to diversify
their service offerings.
In the same proceeding, the Commission noted
that "cable operators [were] emerging as a poten-
tially significant source of competition to LECs in
the provision of local telephone services."' 9 ' The
Commission then sought comments on whether
"LMDS spectrum might be an important adjunct to
cable facilities that can be used in the provision of
18* Id. para. 99 n.96.
183 Id. para. 100.
184 American Scholastic TV Programming Found. V. FCC,
46 F.3d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
ISO LMDS Third NPRM/Tentative Decision, supra note
40, para. 100 nn.98, 99.
ISO Id. para. 101.
187 Id.
'88 See, e.g., Nynex Waiver Order, supra note 140.
189 LMDS Third NPRM/Tentative Decision, supra note
40, para. 106.
'10 Michael Morris, Entry by Cable Television Operators
and Other Entities into the Local Exchange Market, PRACTIC-
ING LAW INST., CABLE TV LAW: 1995 (PLI Order No. G4-
3933. Mar.-Apr. 1995).
191 LMDS Third NPRM/Tentative Decision, supra note
40, para. 106.
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local telephone services in competition with
LECs." 1" In addition, the Commission contends
that MDS licensees may find the two-way capacity
of LMDS services appropriate for the provision of
local telephone services in competition with LECs. It
therefore sought comments on whether MDS licen-
sees should be prohibited from acquiring an LMDS
license within their service areas, "[i]n particular,
[the Commission requested] parties' comments on
whether antitrust issues would be raised by the same
entity holding both types of licenses capable of pro-
viding wireless cable competition.""'  The Commis-
sion's resolution of the comments in this proceeding
will be telling in the analysis of just how much com-
petition in the local loop the Commission currently
envisions and anticipates for the near future.
E. Universal Service
The phrase "universal service" was reportedly
first coined in 1910 by Theodore Vail, President of
AT&T."" In the context of telephone service, uni-
versal service is reflected in "the goal of at least one
telephone with private line service in every home in
America."' 95 Today's definition of universal service
is still unsettled. Definitions range from basic dial
tone to ISDN to broadband services yet to be deter-
mined. 96 Universal service has become an important
point of contention as the local exchange market-
place becomes more competitive and includes new
providers using new technologies." 9  The issue of
how to handle universal service must be addressed as
new services penetrate the local market, in order for
102 Id.
19S Id. para. 107.
194 Fred H. Cate, The Future of Communications Policy
Making, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 22 (1994).
I d. at 23.
1 See Morris, supra note 190.
197 Henry M. Rivera & Laura Johnson, Developments in
the Local Exchange Marketplace, 12TH ANN. INST. ON TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS: POL'Y & REG. (PLI Order No. G4-3930,
Dec. 1994).
198 See, e.g., In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules
and Policies to Increase Subscribership and Usage of the Public
Switched Network, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (July 20,
1995) (describing Link Up and Lifeline Program). See also In
re MTS and WATS Market Structure; Amendment of Parts 67
and 69 of the Commission's Rules and Establishment of a Joint
Board, Decision and Order, 50 Fed. Reg. 939, para. 6 (1985).
199 Rivera & Johnson, supra note 197.
00 Lori A. Burkhart & W. Lynn Garner, Arizona Telcos
Lose Monopoly Hold, FORT., Feb. 15, 1995, at 16 (discussing
the Arizona Corporation Commission's opening of local tele-
phone service to competition in which all companies must par-
the transition to competition in the local market to
be complete. The Commission implemented a num-
ber of universal service programs that seek to pro-
mote the availability of telephone service to all mem-
bers of the public. 98 The BOCs, in particular, need
the Commission to address this issue to prevent them
from carrying the burden of universal service while
other wireless competitors reap the benefits."' Some
states have already addressed this issue in opening
up their local markets.2 00 "Maintaining universal
service has been the single most constant theme in
Judge Greene's [MFJ] waiver jurisprudence" during
the past decade.2 ' Federal and state regulators need
to decide how universal service should be defined
(and how existing programs should be modified) in
the new competitive environment.
IV. LEC STRATEGIES TO COMPETE
A. Background
115 billion dollars is collected annually by local
exchange carriers. 2 About $28 billion of this is for
access charges. 2 3 "Toll calling represents another
$12 billion of the market and local service is about
$48 billion. '2 4 "The remaining $27 billion is com-
prised of cellular [service], directories, international
[calls] and other services [e.g., equipment sales]. 20 5
Although BOCs are prohibited from providing long
distance services from one LATA to another, they
can charge companies who provide the service for
use of their local exchange facilities.2 0
LECs will continue to hold a market share in the
ticipate in a universal service fund).
21 KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, at 380 (citing United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 1091 (D.D.C.
1983); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp.
131, 169, 224 n.376 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983)).
'o' A Critical Piece of the Communications Puzzle, CS
FIRST BOSTON, Feb. 21, 1995, at 21.
208 Id. The origination or termination of long-distance or in-
terexchange services is commonly known as access services. The
Commission regulates the provision of interstate access service by
LECs. In re Nynex Telephone Companies Petition for Waiver:
Transition Plan to Preserve Universal Service in a Competitive
Environment, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd.
7445, para. 3 (1995).
204 Id.
01 A Critical Piece of the Communications Puzzle, supra
note 202.
'06 United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp.
131 (D.D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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local exchange market due to their existing infra-
structure, experience in advertising and marketing,
and name recognition in the region (i.e., loyal cus-
tomer base). The question is, how much will wire-
less services cut into their profits? Some industry ex-
perts believe that "wireless access may be cheaper
over the long run than copper wire . . . [and] wire-
less access will take a dominant share of the busi-
ness." 107 Industry experts believe in the survivability
of LECs in the wired local exchange because compe-
tition "will inevitably drive down access charges and
toll rates, redistribute the universal service subsidy
among all service [providers] . . . and cause the local
exchange carriers to cut costs."12 0  Even if the wired
connection does not become cheaper than wireless
access, analysts posit, wireline access may not need
to be cheaper to survive because "the local loop is
making the transition from a slow-speed, narrow-
band connection to a high-speed broadband
connection."20 9
[Once a broadband loop connects customers to the local
exchange carrier, the dynamics of the cost comparison
with wireless become irrelevant [because the] incremental
cost of a voice call over a broadband link is next to zero,
and based upon the utilization of the network, it may be
priced close to zero. 10
"Fixed costs are a source of economies of scale that
is . . . significant in [the] telecommunications [indus-
try]."2 ' "The fixed costs of establishing a network
system are the costs of facilities such as transmission
lines, costs which are not sensitive to the level of
transmission on the lines. 12" The BOCs already
have their networks in place and will be able to use
those networks as they prepare to provide integrated
services. BOCs are responding to imminent competi-
tion by building and buying new facilities. By 1996,
BellSouth plans to deploy broadband network of its
own and have Atlanta covered with fiber.2"' US
West's purchase of twenty-five percent of Time
207 A Critical Piece of the Communications Puzzle, supra
note 202, at 20.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 20-21.
211 Spulber, supra note 1, at 31.
212 Id. at 31-32.
212 John S. Harrison, Assault on a Stronghold, FORT., June
15, 1994, at 38.
214 Id.
10 Sakelaris, supra note 34.
216 SBMS Declaratory Ruling, supra note 12.
217 Section 22.903 of the Commission's rules was amended
effective January 1, 1995. See also In re Revision of Part 22 of
the Commission's Rules Governing the Public Mobile Services,
Warner for $2.5 billion gives it a stake in Time
Warner Cable, as well as Time Warner's affiliated
competitive access providers ("CAPS").
21 4
B. Integrated Wireline and Wireless Service
Offerings
The RBOCs have recently looked at innovative
ways to provide competition in the local exchange
market outside of the region where they serve as the
LEC. The A block cellular operator in Chicago, Illi-
nois, Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems ("SBMS"),
the cellular affiliate of Southwestern Bell Telephone,
contends that it will keep its customers even after the
PCS players, AT&T Wireless and PCS PrimeCo
L.P., introduce service. 18 However, SBMS is taking
steps to ensure its ability to compete. On June 21,
1995, SBMS filed a Declaratory Ruling Request
with the Commission seeking clarification of Section
22.903 of the Commission's rules regarding limita-
tions on the provision of out-of-region landline ex-
change services. 2 SBMS requested that the Com-
mission clarify that neither Section 22.903 nor any
other section of the Commission's rules imposes sep-
arate subsidiary or other structural safeguards on the
provision of out-of-region landline local exchange
service by the cellular affiliate of a BOC.217
Section 22.903 is an example of a structural safe-
guard that was adopted before the Commission or
the courts envisioned that BOCs would have the
ability to provide the type of integrated service
SBMS wishes to provide. The original version of
Section 22.903 was adopted as Section 22.901 in
1981, when the Commission amended Part 22 of its
rules to provide for the authorization of two cellular
licensees in each market - one wireline carrier and
one non-wireline carrier.2 8 In order to deter wire-
line carriers from using their market power to en-
gage in anticompetitive practices in the provision of
Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 6513 (1994). See also 47 C.F.R.
§ 22.903(a),(b)(1994). SBMS argued that "the [Commission's]
rules permit the cellular affiliate of an RBOC, acting on its own
behalf or through a closely-integrated corporate affiliate, to pro-
vide landline local exchange service, both indirectly (through re-
sale) and directly through the ownership or lease of landline lo-
cal exchange facilities, provided that the proposed service is
outside the region in which the BOC affiliated with the cellular
carrier is the. . .LEC." SBMS Declaratory Ruling, supra note
12, para. 1.
218 In re Inquiry Into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz
and 870-890 MHz for Cellular Communications Systems;
Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the Commissions Rules, Re-
port and Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 469 (1981) [hereinafter 1981
Order].
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cellular service, the Commission required all wire-
line carriers to establish separate subsidiaries to pro-
vide cellular service.2 19 Section 22.901(b) was also
added to the rules and stated, in pertinent part, that
wireline cellular licensees "may not own facilities for
the provision of landline telephone service."2 In
1981, the two available services were wired local ex-
change and cellular service. A service that would in-
tegrate wireless and wireline services was not con-
templated. Separate subsidiary requirements were
placed on all wireline carriers to prevent them from
"using predatory pricing tactics or misallocating the
shared costs of cellular and conventional wireline
service .... ,,22
In 1982, the Commission changed the rule to ap-
ply separate subsidiary requirements for cellular ser-
vice only to AT&T because the costs of structural
separation for carriers unaffiliated with AT&T out-
weighed the potential benefits stemming from the
separate subsidiary requirement.2 2 The Commission
concluded that informal complaint procedures, ap-
plied in addition to the strict interconnection re-
quirements, would adequately protect against im-
proper activity by these cellular carriers. 2
Restrictions were placed on AT&T because the
Commission determined that AT&T's size and dom-
inant position in the telecommunications industry
(i.e., monopoly power) gave it the unique ability to
engage in anticompetitive activities with respect to
cellular service that would be difficult to detect ab-
sent structural separation rules.22 4 The Commission
noted that: (1) the structural safeguards imposed on
AT&T would prevent any cross-subsidization or in-
terconnection abuses; and (2) the costs of structural
219 Id.
220 47 C.F.R. § 22.901(c)(1)(1994).
,21 1981 Order, supra note 218, para. 48.
" In re Inquiry Into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz
and 870-890 MHz for Cellular Communications Systems and
Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the Commission's Rules Rela-
tive to Cellular Communications Systems, Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order on Reconsideration, 89 F.C.C.2d 58, 60 (1982)
[hereinafter 1982 Order].
22 Id. paras. 45-46.
224 Id. para. 46.
228 Id. paras. 43-45.
220 In re Policy and Rules Concerning the Furnishing of
Customer Premises Equipment, Enhanced Services and Cellular
Communications Services by the Bell Operating Companies, Re-
port and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 1117, paras. 57-59, 90 (1983),
afld sub nom. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 465 (7th
Cir. 1984).
27 SBMS Declaratory Ruling, supra note 12, para. 8.
"SBMS currently provides cellular service in several markets
[outside of SWBT's LEC service area] including Chicago, Bos-
separation for AT&T were duplicative staffs and
diseconomies resulting from separate transmission
facilities.2 25 In 1983, post-divestiture, the Commis-
sion transferred the separate subsidiary requirements
to the BOCs.2"
SBMS proposed to provide what it described as
"competitive landline local exchange" ("CLLE")
service in some or all of the markets in which it cur-
rently provides cellular service.227 According to
SBMS, this would enable SBMS to offer "one-stop
shopping" to consumers through integrated offerings
of CLLE and wireless services.2 2 8 "To provide
CLLE on a competitive and cost-effective basis,
SBMS proposed to integrate landline facilities with
its existing cellular network and switches."' SBMS
would then be able to combine "cellular and CLLE
operations such as credit confirmation, billing and
collection, customer care, and financial control," thus
providing a package comparable to PCS service. 0
SBMS contended that it was probable that PCS
PrimeCo and other competitors would seek to pro-
vide similar integrated services in competition with
SBMS in Southwestern Bell's in-region territo-
ries.2"1 SBMS further noted that these companies
(including PCS PrimeCo which consists of four
BOCs) would have no separation requirements. a 2
According to SBMS, CLLE service would provide a
competitive alternative to existing LECs in the mar-
kets where it was offered. 83 SBMS asserted it had
neither monopoly power nor market influence
outside the region in which Southwestern Bell was
the incumbent LEC. 3 4 As previously noted, the
question of whether BOCs still maintain monopoly
power in-region is currently at issue given new local
ton, Washington/Baltimore, [and several markets in upstate
New York]. SBMS proposes initially to provide integrated cellu-
lar and CLLE services in Rochester, New York." Id. at i-ii.
SBMS has also applied with the Illinois Commerce Commission
for permission to provide CLLE service in the Chicago area. Id.
at i n.1.
228 For example, CLLE users would potentially be able to
use a hand-set that operates as a landline-based cordless tele-
phone inside a building and as a cellular telephone when taken
outside. Id. at 8.
828 Id. para. 19.
280 Id. SBMS intends to offer customers "one-stop shop-
ping" and unified billing for combinations of wireline and wire-
less service. Id.
221 Id. at n.51.
222 Id.
222 SBMS noted that it was not seeking to acquire the ex-
isting LEC in any market, rather SBMS would be in direct





On October 25, 1995, the Commission denied
SBMS's Declaratory Ruling request but granted
SBMS a waiver of Section 22.903.25 Thus, SBMS
would be permitted to offer integrated services using
its existing cellular facilities, systems and personnel
to compete directly with incumbent LECs and other
wireless service providers in the local exchange mar-
ket. Denial of the declaratory ruling means that
other BOCs will need to request similar relief if they
wish to provide similar CLLE packages. In granting
SBMS a waiver, the Commission stated that "[it
found] merit in SBMS's contention that when the
language in Section 22.903 was first adopted, the
Commission did not contemplate RBOCs providing
out-of-region cellular service."2 , In addition, the
Commission found that, because SBMS is structur-
ally separate from Southwestern Bell Telephone,
there was no need to impose additional structural
separation requirements on SBMS.23 7 Moreover, the
Commission reasoned that there was little risk of
SBMS obtaining preferential local exchange access
in areas not served by SWBT " and that requiring
SBMS to create a structurally separate entity to pro-
vide CLLE would impose a significant and unneces-
sary regulatory burden on a potentially valuable
service.2 9
On August 25, 1995, BellSouth Corporation
("BellSouth"), filed a request similar to that of
SBMS, requesting authorization to resell cellular
service without being subject to structural separation
requirements contained in Section 22.903 of the
Commission's rules.24 BellSouth's request differed
from SBMS's Declaratory Ruling request however,
because BellSouth did not specify whether it was
seeking authority to resell cellular service both in-
region and out-of-region.2 1 ,In addition, grant of the
'" In re Motion of Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc.
for a Declaratory Ruling that Section 22.903 and other Sections
of the Commission's Rules to Permit the Cellular Affiliate of a
Bell Operating Company to Provide Competitive Landline Local
Exchange Service Outside the Region in which the Bell Operat-
ing Company is the Local Exchange Carrier, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, DA 95-1572 (1995).
23I Id. para. 19.
2I7 Id. para. 18.
238 Id.
211 Id. para. 19.
240 In re BellSouth Corporation Request for Authorization
to Engage in Resale of Cellular Service Without Structural Sep-
aration Pursuant to Section 22.903 of the Commission's Rules,
Request for Resale Authorization, (1995)[hereinafter BellSouth
Request](on file with author). BellSouth noted that structural
separation rule deprived BellSouth of the ability to offer its cus-
tomers one-stop shopping for wired and wireless services. Bell-
request would allow BellSouth to buy cellular ser-
vice from its own cellular subsidiary. 42 Thus, as a
reseller, BellSouth could potentially obtain service
from one or both of the two licensed carriers in a
market at the same wholesale price available to any
other similarly situated reseller. In the fourteen
years since the rule was adopted to protect the cellu-
lar industry from potential cross-subsidization and
discriminatory interconnection practices by LECs,
BellSouth claimed the Commission never found any
evidence of wireline cross-subsidization of cellular
service." The Commission requested and received
comment (both in opposition and in support) on this
request."" Not surprisingly, the majority of com-
ments in support of the request were filed by
RBOCs or their cellular affiliates who may wish to
provide similar service in the future, whereas the
comments in opposition to the request were filed by
new PCS providers and companies such as MCI and
Nextel, that believe that granting a request such as
this would be anticompetitive given the lack of actual
competition currently in place in the local exchange.
BellSouth contended that authorization to resell cel-
lular service was needed immediately to permit Bell-
South's PCS subsidiary to develop a working busi-
ness and a customer base before it completes the
construction of its PCS network.24
BellSouth included a chart in its authorization re-
quest illustrating that "[BOCs] are effectively pre-
cluded from designing end-to-end networks and or-
ganizational structures to deliver services in the most
efficient manner possible. '246 Among other services
that BellSouth determines BOCs are prohibited from
providing, BellSouth pointed out that AT&T, Sprint
(including the PCS venture WirelessCo, L.P.) and
GTE were all permitted to provide cellular service,
whereas BOCs cannot provide even cellular resale
South argued that circumstances have changed dramatically
since structural separation requirements were adopted. On June
22, 1995, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau issued a de-
claratory ruling in response to BellSouth's request for clarifica-
tion of the scope of the cellular structural separation rule. In re
BellSouth Corporation, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.,
BellSouth Cellular Corp., Petition for Declaratory Ruling, DA
95-1401 (June 22, 1995).
241 BellSouth Request, supra note 240, at 1.
242 Id.
24 Id. at i.
"4 Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment
on BellSouth Corporation's Request for Resale Authorization,
Public Notice (Aug. 31, 1995) [hereinafter Resale Public
Notice).
"4' BellSouth Request, supra note 240, at 20.
246 Id. at 22.
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without the use of a separate subsidiary .2 7 Bell-
South did not distinguish itself from providers such
as GTE and AT&T and requested that the Com-
mission treat BellSouth in a similar manner to GTE
regarding structural separation requirements.248
On October 11, 1995, Ameritech Communications
Inc. ("ACI") requested a limited waiver of Section
22.903.249 ACI is a newly-formed, structurally sepa-
rate subsidiary of Ameritech Corporation that is
seeking authority to provide wireless and wireline
services, both long distance and local, as a facilities
based carrier and through resale on an unseparated
basis.2 60 The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
established a comment cycle which closed on Novem-
ber 9, 1995.
Although the requests of Southwestern Bell, Bell-
South, and Ameritech were all unique, the Commis-
sion should anticipate similar waivers from other
BOCs and BOC affiliates as they seek opportunities
in regions other than their own and as they
strategize to develop integrated service packages. For
example, Bell Atlantic and US West supported Bell-
South's request and proposed that the Commission
extend relief to all the BOCs.2 5 ' The Commission
must determine whether competition from new ser-
vices and service providers does in fact take away the
ability of RBOCs to engage in cross-subsidy and in-
terconnection abuses. In addition, the Commission
must determine whether these issues can be resolved
through procedural tools such as waivers, or whether
a rulemaking procedure examining all the related is-
sues would be beneficial. In any event, it is apparent
from these requests that BellSouth, Ameritech and
Southwestern Bell realize that survival in the local
exchange market will involve gaining customer loy-
alty early and being able to transition customers
smoothly from one service (cellular) to another
(PCS). BellSouth claimed that its "inability to pro-
247 Id.
148 Resale Public Notice, supra note 244, at 35 n.89.
"' In re Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Com-
ment on Ameritech's Petition for Partial Waiver of Section
22.903 of the Commission's Rules, Public Notice (Oct. 19,
1995).
25 Id.
'"" Comments of Bell Atlantic to BellSouth's Request,
CWD-95-11, at 2 (Sept. 18, 1995); Comments of US West to
BellSouth's Request, CWD-95-11, at 1 (Sept. 18, 1995).
252 BellSouth Request, supra note 240, at i.
2"' Barrett & Marchant, supra note 32, at 6. The Commis-
sion addressed the issue of whether LECs should be able to ac-
quire PCS licenses and attempted to weigh the advantages of
LEC entry against the potential disadvantages, including assess-
ing the competitive impact of allowing LECs to acquire spec-
vide its customers with resold cellular service - par-
ticularly at the earliest stages - place[d] it at a tre-
mendous competitive disadvantage."2 52
C. PCS Joint Ventures
PCS is generally viewed by the local exchange
carriers as a way to extend the reach of the local
public switched telephone network.2 5 Consequently,
these companies have teamed up with other service
providers to offer PCS. PCS licensees include a
number of cable, wireline telephone, and cellular
telephone company consortia, including WirelessCo,
L.P. (Sprint Telecommunications, Inc., Cox Cable
and Comcast Telephony), PCS PrimeCo, L.P. (Bell
Atlantic Personal Communications, Inc., NYNEX
PCS, Inc., AirTouch Communications, Inc., and US
West, Inc.), and AT&T Wireless.2 54
In the Chicago market, AT&T Wireless and PCS
PrimeCo won broadband PCS MTA licenses.
2 55
AT&T Wireless is planning to offer "in-building
wireless" service which gives customers a single
phone they can use in their office complex 2" and at
home, under both flat and mobile rates. This service
allows AT&T a way to get back into the provision
of local services. It is highly unlikely that PCS
PrimeCo will offer a competing service such as this
because it has a disincentive to compete with the in-
cumbent LEC.257 BOCs do need to be mindful of the
spectrum aggregation rules adopted by the
Commission.25 8
Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, and Pacific Telesis Group
announced the formation of a joint venture into in-
teractive video networks in October of 1994.259 This
joint venture, Tele-TV, plans to compete with cable
TV companies by delivering a combination of cable,
video-on-demand and other interactive services using
wireline and wireless technologies. 2 6 0 Tele-TV could
trum for wireless PCS services as a part of their local phone
network. PCS NPRM, supra note 6, para. 71.
254 Public Notice, supra note 72.
255 Id.
256 Id.
151 Sakelaris, supra note 34. PCS PrimeCo is owned by
three BOCs: Bell Atlantic, Nynex, US West and former RBOC
Airtouch Communications. See also, FCC Grants 99 Licenses,
supra note 71.
288 See 47 C.F.R. § 20.6 (1994).
289 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in
the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Notice of
Inquiry, 10 FCC Rcd. 7805, para. 55 (1995) [hereinafter Video
Programming NOI].
280 Mark Berniker, Tele-TV Changes its Deal with CAA,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 28, 1995, at 14. Tele-TV origi-
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potentially service more than thirty million homes in
six of the top seven markets. 61 "Ameritech, Bell-
South and Southwestern Bell Cellular announced a
definitive agreement with Disney Corporation to de-
velop and package video programming and interac-
tive services. ' '1 62 Companies are also forming consor-
tiums to participate in the C block auction for PCS,
including many rural telephone companies. For ex-
ample, Roseville Telephone Company recently an-
nounced a PCS consortium called West Coast PCS
L.L.C., which intends to pursue BTA licenses in
California, Oregon, Washington, and Nevada.2 8
D. Mergers
Beginning in 1993, there have been a series of
proposed mergers and alliances that will position
major telephone companies to compete for the fu-
ture.26 "The advent of PCS is having a profound
effect on the present marketplace by being a precipi-
tating factor in major mergers and joint ventures in
the wireless industry." '265 BOCs need to position
themselves to compete and need to form alliances for
this purpose. In September 1993, US West com-
pleted the acquisition of a 25.51 percent stake in
Time Warner Entertainment.' " The Commission
granted an eighteen-month waiver of its cable-telco
cross-ownership rules to enable Time Warner to
divest its eight cable systems located in U.S. West's
region. 67 This alliance will enable US West to com-
pete with other local exchange telephone companies
by providing integrated telephone and cable opera-
tions. LECs are not the only providers determined to
provide integrated wireline and wireless services.
The recent AT&T/McCaw Cellular merger could
nally had a deal with Creative Artists Agency (CAA), but, fol-
lowing the departure of CAA's Michael Ovitz to Walt Disney
Co., that business arrangement ended. Id. Despite ending the
agreement with CAA, Tele-TV will retain CAA's Robert
Kavner and Jim Griffiths on a consulting basis. Id.
261 Id.
282 Video Programming NOI, supra note 259, para. 55
n. 100.
28' Roseville Builds Consortium for 'C-Block' Auction, May
Partner with U.S. Airwaves, PCS WK., Aug. 9, 1995, at 8. The
President of Foresthill Telephone Co., a small rural telephone
company in California, stated that they joined the consortium
because "[w]e feel that [PCS] is a source of bypass [of the local
loop] - we don't feel we can choose to ignore it." Id.
284 Andrew C. Barrett, Shifting Foundations: The Regula-
tion of Telecommunications in an Era of Change, 46 FED.
COMM. L. J. 39, 42 (1993).
205 In re Petition of Arizona Corp. Comm'n To Extend
State Authority Over Rate And Entry Regulation of All Com-
mercial Mobile Radio Services and In re Implementation of Sec-
prove to be a threat to the BOCs.
In November 1992, McCaw Cellular Communications,
the largest cellular telephone service provider in the
United States, agreed to a one-third acquisition by
AT&T, the largest interexchange carrier in the United
States, and to grant AT&T the option to acquire eventual
control of McCaw. AT&T announced that it would exer-
cise its option to acquire 100 percent of McCaw."




in effect recreates for certain markets a more technologi-
cally advanced version of the former Bell System. A fiber-
optic interexchange network will be joined at each end by
a wireless version of the local exchange. The wireless ac-
cess lines are, for the time being, still dependent on the
LEC's wire-based local loop for switching."'
However, for AT&T and McCaw, which at the
time of their merger announcement had combined
assets of sixty-six billion dollars, the costs of install-
ing their own switches, would not be insurmountable
compared to the monetary benefits to be derived
from creating their own wireless local exchange" to
by-pass the local loop.271 McCaw Cellular, now
called AT&T Wireless, will use the AT&T name to
sell its products. 72 When the McCaw Cellular unit
switched to the AT&T label for the company's pag-
ing services, the number of potential customers call-
ing the service went from 600 to 6,000 customers a
week.2 78  BellSouth executives contend that "[i]f
AT&T comes into our business, they'll take thirty
percent of our base within three to five years."
27 '
BOC cellular affiliates are also planning mergers
to compete with potential new wireless service prov-
iders in their markets. On May 19, 1995, the Com-
mission granted NYNEX Mobile Communications
tions 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Report and Or-
der and Order on Reconsideration, 10 FCC Rcd. 7824, para. 24
(1995).
.8. Barrett, supra note 264, at 46.
"2 See In re Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P., and
US West Communications, Inc., Petition for Waiver of Section
63.54 of the Commission's Rules, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 7106 (1993).
*" J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications in Jericho, 81
CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1224 (1993).
1e1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., CURRENT TRENDS IN THE
MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL, 1994, at 7, 43 (PLI
Corp. Law. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-878,
1995).
70 Sidak, supra note 268, at 1224.
271 Id.
272 Keller, supra note 8, at Al, A6.
273 Id.
27" Id. at Al.
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Company ("NYNEX Mobile") and Bell Atlantic
Mobile Systems, Inc. ("BAMS") permission to
transfer control of eighty-two radio licenses to Cellco
Partnership ("Cellco"), a new partnership consisting
of subsidiaries of both NYNEX Mobile and
BAMS.275 In this transfer of control Order, the
Commission discussed the impact on competition in
the affected cellular markets as a result of the
merger.2 The Commission found that the merger
would not result in anti-competitive effects but
would provide some pro-competitive effects. 2" The
relevant geographic markets (the cellular service cov-
erage areas) are completely separate. The Commis-
sion declined to find a regional or national geo-
graphic market. 2 8 BAMS and NYNEX have agreed
to divest ownership interests in A-side cellular sys-
tems in the ten markets in which they currently both
have interests (i.e., in the two competing cellular sys-
tems).279 However, in opposition, McCaw Cellular
argued that the BAMS/NYNEX Mobile merger
would reduce future competition by effectively dis-
suading BAMS and NYNEX from "competing with
each other in wireless services other than cellular,"
such as PCS.280 The Commission disagreed stating
that "there is no lack of firms vying to enter PCS
• . . the alliance of BAMS and NYNEX Mobile
will not reduce the number of entrants into PCS be-




Since many of the companies that provide telecom-
munications services today, as well as those poised to
enter competitive local service markets, will likely
operate in multiple state jurisdictions, uniform
guidelines for regulatory policy development would
appear to be in the national interest.28 2 A new tele-
"" In re Bell Atlantic Mobile Systems, Inc. and NYNEX
Mobile Comm. Co. Application For Transfer of Control of
Eighty-Two Cellular Radio Licenses to Cellco Partnership, Or-
der, 77 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1487 (1995).
276 Id. paras. 14-15, 22-25.
277 Id. para. 15.
278 Id. paras. 17-19.
"' Id. paras. 22-23.
280 Id. para. 38 n.58.
281 Id. para. 38 n.61.
... Keith Bissell, Hold the Phone! A National Telecommu-
nications Policy Is Within Our Grasp, FORT., Nov. 15, 1994, at
32, 34.
283 The BOCs have an impressive group of lobbyists includ-
ing Lynn Martin, ex-Labor Secretary; Roy Neel, President
Clinton's ex-Deputy Chief of Staff; and Griffin Bell, who served
as Attorney General under President Carter. Marcia Stepanek,
communications bill, set for final battle in Congress,
has .precipitated massive lobbying efforts on the part
of local exchange carriers, in particular the seven
RBOCs, 8 3 and the long distance carriers alike.2 '
The major focus of the pending legislation is to abol-
ish, restrict or limit government regulation of tele-
phone companies. Statutory barriers to entry of new
LECs could be eliminated. The legislation will go
before a House-Senate Conference Committee this
fall. Different versions of the bill were passed earlier
this summer by each chamber. 8 However, Presi-
dent Clinton is threatening to veto the final bill be-
cause "[i]nstead of promoting investment and compe-
tition, [tihe legislation would promote mergers and
concentration of power [in a few major
companies]."28
The provisions in the Senate bill provide that an
RBOC and any affiliate that provides telephone ex-
change service must create a separate subsidiary to
provide interLATA services except if those services
are incidental, not including information services, or
out-of-region.2 8 This provision would allow BOC
affiliates such as SBMS to provide local exchange
services out-of-region without creating a separate
subsidiary. Upon enactment and subject to some
safeguards, RBOCs may provide incidental in-
terLATA service to (1) provide audio, video, or other
programming services to subscribers; (2) provide a
telecommunications service between LATAs within a
cable system franchise area; and (3) provide and pro-
cure information storage located between LATAs.
Upon enactment, H.R. 1555 will allow for an
RBOC to provide interLATA service within a par-
ticular state upon approval by the Commission of a
verification that the RBOC satisfied certain competi-
tive conditions within that state. RBOCs may begin
seeking approval for entry eighteen months after en-
actment of H.R. 1555, and may provide incidental
For Lobbyists, Telecom Bill is Manna From Heaven, DENVER
POST, Aug. 20, 1995, at HI.
284 Mike Mills, House Approves Phone, Cable Bill: Act
Would Open Market for Local Calls, End TV System Rate
Curbs, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1995, at A10. "Most consumers, if
they know about the bill, learned of it from the millions of dol-
lars worth of advertising that has been spent as part of the battle
between the [RBOCs] and the long distance industry." Id.
288 S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 1555, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
28$ Stepanek, supra note 283, at HI.
287 S. 652, supra note 285, at § 102; see also 141 CONG.
REC. S8573 (daily ed. June 16, 1995) (emphasis added). Addi-
tional exception to services for which a separate affiliate is re-
quired are "services authorized under an Order entered by the
United States District Court." Id.
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interLATA service at any time.288
The legislation also contains provisions for RBOC
entry into the manufacture of telecommunications
equipment and customer premises equipment, provi-
sion of electronic publishing, alarm monitoring,
telemessaging services, and payphone services.2 89 In
addition, the legislation addresses the preemption of
state regulation, interconnection requirements and
other issues that directly affect competition in the lo-
cal exchange market.290
F. Restrictions Preventing LEC Competition
LECs are restricted by the courts, the Commis-
sion, state regulation and lack of legislative reform.
As previously discussed, the states have begun to be
responsive to changes in the local market. Statutes
vary from state to state. Some prohibit local ex-
change competition, while others require a showing
that the incumbent carrier cannot provide adequate
service. In addition some states apply a public inter-
est standard.29' "State Commission's policies range
from open entry to retention of monopoly status for
the provision of local exchange service. '"292 The
BOCs need to be able to act as full-service networks,
providing integrated service to customers in order to
compete with wireless technologies. Currently, the
MFJ prevents the BOCs from offering long distance
service, manufacturing telephone equipment and
providing video information services.29 The MFJ's
line-of-business-restriction prohibits an RBOC from
transporting calls across LATA boundaries. 9 ' The
Cable Communications Policy Act of 198495 pro-
hibits a telephone company from providing video
programming in its area of telephone service.
296
Although a comprehensive review of the MFJ-im-
posed restrictions placed on BOCs is beyond the
28 H.R. 1555, supra note 285.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Morris, supra note 190, at 4.
292 Id.
292 United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp.
131 (D.D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd sub noma. Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
294 Id. The MFJ defines LATA or exchange area as contig-
uous areas in which the BOCs are restricted for the provision of
local exchange telephone service. Id. LATAs define areas of
common interest in which the BOCs are permitted to provide
intra-LATA or local telephone service. Id. (InterLata, between
LATA's and long distance service is restricted to interexchange
carriers ("IXCs") such as AT&T). Id.
'5 See Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984).
scope of this article, suffice it to say that many of the
purposes for the restrictions no longer exist in to-
day's competitive market. It may be that with either
the pending legislation, or action by the courts, the
MFJ may be eliminated even before the Commission
reevaluates its regulatory position on the provision of
services in the local exchange. Many parties favor a
comprehensive reform of the structural and non-
structural safeguards, as well as the jurisdictional
rules governing cellular and wireline services.2 9 7 As
previously discussed, BOCs are beginning to file
waivers with regards to some of the existing regula-
tions, in order to allow the BOCs to more freely plan
for the provision of wireless services. These waivers,
and more, may be filed in the coming months, indi-
cating that a comprehensive review of both the MFJ
and FCC regulations is needed. Moreover, some
companies oppose waivers under these circum-
stances, because instead of granting the waivers, they
argue, the Commission should use these opportuni-
ties to conduct broad-based inquiries to develop a
plan to reform the telecommunications regulations
during the transition from monopoly to
competition. 98
V. THE FUTURE OF THE LOCAL EX-
CHANGE MARKET
Technological developments in the telecommunica-
tions arena will benefit local exchange providers as
well as wireless service providers. LECs will be able
to provide a plethora of new services over the local
wired network. Providers will be able to offer cus-
tomers a phone in the home that operates over the
local wired network and when they leave the home
(or the immediate calling area) the phone will access
an external wireless network. 99
J" Sidak, supra note 268, at 1225 n.5.
,, In re NYNEX Petition for Waiver, Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7445, para. 1 (1995). See Com-
ments of Illinois Commerce Commission ("ICC"), filed July 20,
1995, in response to SBMS Declaratory Ruling, supra note 12,
at 14-15.
298 Rochester Petition, supra note 144. AT&T and MCI op-
posed the Rochester Telephone waiver stating that the Commis-
sion should be determining whether the rules in question should
be revised. MCI further asserted that independent proposals and
test cases, like that presented by Rochester Telephone, were not
particularly helpful. MCI also disagreed with Rochester Tele-
phone's suggestion that its Open Market Plan could become a
test for a fully competitive local exchange market. Id. para. 8.
999 A Critical Piece of the Communications Puzzle, supra
note 202, para. 21; see also SBMS Declaratory Ruling, supra
note 12, at 8.
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The Commission encourages local loop competi-
tion and has recently addressed this issue in several
proceedings.8 00 The development of wireless services
is one of several potential sources of competition that
the Commission identified in order to bring market
forces to bear on the existing LECsO °1 The Commis-
sion noted that, "[elfficient provision of wireless ser-
vice may also create alternatives for those not served
by traditional wireline providers and should create
competition for existing wireline and wireless ser-
vices."8 2 Nevertheless, the Commission needs to
continue to take action to promote competition and
reevaluate current regulatory policies concerning
competitive concerns. Whether the actions of the
Commission, combined with state and federal regu-
lation, will provide for effective competition in the
local loop remains unclear because, while the federal
legislation passed, it has not been enacted. Further-
more, the impact of PCS and other wireless services
on the local exchange market remains undetermined.
Cellular providers who intend to integrate wire-
line services with existing cellular infrastructure in
local exchange markets have the potential to provide
competitive choices to the public rapidly. Two or
more PCS licensees will set up systems as early as
1996, in markets currently serviced by two cellular
operators per market. Although one Commission
goal in allocating PCS spectrum was to create com-
petition for the cellular duopoly currently in exis-
tence, many new entrants in the market are current
cellular operators that have won licenses in the PCS
auction (most of them in alliance with each other or
other companies), which will allow them to expand
their present service area into adjoining markets. 88
It may be that a small number of major players
dominate this market through mergers and joint
agreements, as well as participating in auctions for
licenses in services such as PCS, where the costs of
licenses may prove prohibitive to all but the major
established telecommunications companies. Further,
each service provider in any given market may not
800 See discussion supra part III.
801 In re Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange
Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 9 FCC Rcd. 1687,
para. 2 (1994) (allocation of spectrum for new wireless services,
along with Open Network Architecture Tariffs, expanded inter-
connection, 800 database technology, and video dialtone "are all
examples of the increasing capability of the telephone network,
and all contribute to making that network open to market
forces").
808 Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order, supra
note 63, para. 7.
808 Sakelaris, supra note 34, at 25.
80 There are 12-15 potential wireless service providers in
be able to obtain the customer base it needs to sur-
vive, given the number of licenses the Commission
granted in each area.804
Notwithstanding the Commission's goal of effec-
tive competition in the local exchange market, any
one location in the country could feasibly receive a
formidable array of competitive mobile services.308
Competing in this market will be difficult and ex-
tremely capital intensive. As previously discussed,
the recent events surrounding the C Block auction
make it evident that smaller, economically disadvan-
taged companies may still not be given the opportu-
nity they need to compete, despite the efforts of both
Congress and the Commission. Customers want ac-
cess to people and information, at anytime and any-
where. The Commission wants consumers to be
given this opportunity and stated that "[w]e believe
that mobile services will play an increasingly impor-
tant role in the nation's telecommunications net-
works, and we believe that nondiscriminatory access
to mobile services will give consumers the opportu-
nity to realize the expanding benefits of wireless
technologies . "...806
This article briefly discusses some of the issues
faced by major players in the local exchange market
today. It is not yet certain whether all the potential
service providers in each market will survive. Con-
sumer choice is a phenomenon that is predicted with
no great amount of certainty, but it is widely ac-
cepted that name recognition, convenience, accessibil-
ity of services, and marketing strategy can influence
consumers. In order for developing services in the lo-
cal exchange market to benefit the consumer, wire-
less technology must provide quality services and en-
hanced competition, thereby keeping costs of quality
service low.
The Commission seems committed to creating at
least the opportunity for competition in the local ex-
change market. The assumptions on which the eve-
ryday consumer bases his current perception of the
local exchange market will evolve as new wireless
any given area. Two cellular providers (A and B licensees), two
broadband PCS major trading areas ("MTA") licensees, five ba-
sic trading areas ("BTA") broadband PCS licensees, several 900
MHz narrowband PCS providers, several radio paging networks
and a number of unlicensed PCS devices authorized under Part
15 of the FCC's rules. This number does not consider competi-
tors in wireline services who may be competing for the same
market. See also supra notes 48, 49, 64, 66, 67 and accompany-
ing text.
305 Id.
8' In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the
Communications Act, Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd.
1411, para. 27 (1994).
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systems provide innovative services to the consumer
and challenge the dominance of the LEC in the local
exchange market. The BOCs do not intend to be left
behind. BOCs are seeking ways to provide new ser-
vices, maintain customer loyalty, and use the advan-
tages that exist by virtue of their present influence
on the local exchange market, to their benefit, in the
race to compete. The BOCs are engaging in strategic
planning, such as forming joint ventures with other
telecommunications companies, lobbying for provi-
sions favorable to them in the pending telecommuni-
cations legislation, and filing for waivers of Commis-
sion rules that place restrictions on their ability to
s"0 S. 652, supra note 285; H.R. 1555, supra note 285.
compete.807 According to several of the BOCs, waiv-
ers will enable them to (1) compete more effectively
with wireless service providers in their local ex-
change market, and (2) diversify their offerings to
counteract a possible decrease in profits resulting
from new local service providers. In addition, it is
unlikely that BOCs, no matter how integrated wire-
less and wireline exchange service become, will allow
the wireline exchange to become obsolete. However,
the future of the local exchange market will become
evident as the local exchange market takes on a new
face in the 1990s and beyond.
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